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Introduction
When people lie to obtain money, we call it theft.1 When they lie to enter
private property, we call it trespass. 2 When they lie to obtain sex . . . we have no
idea what to call it. Some call it lawful seduction. 3 Others call it criminal rape. 4
An Israeli court recently aligned itself with the latter camp when it convicted an
Arab man of rape-by-deception for falsely claiming that he was a Jewish bache-

1.

See, e.g., State v. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa 1996) (holding that the defendant
could be convicted of theft by deception for obtaining property by issuing a check
that he never had an intention to pay).

2.

See, e.g., Mayfield Heights v. Riddle, 670 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(asserting that a defendant is liable for criminal trespass by deception when she is
“aware either that a false impression is created or perpetuated or, knowing that the
victim holds a false impression, withholds or prevents the victim from obtaining
information to the contrary”).

3.

See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 392 (1994) (“Seduction, even when
honeycombed with lies that would convict the man of fraud if he were merely trying to obtain money, is not rape.”).

4.

See, e.g., Tom Dougherty, No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on “Rapeby-deception,” 123 YALE L.J. F. 321, 333 (2013) (“[W]e should reluctantly accept that
someone can be guilty of rape-by-deception by [obtaining sex as a result of] falsely
saying he went to Yale.”).

408

SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION

SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION

lor in order to have sex with a Jewish woman. 5 So too did a Scottish court when
it convicted a transgendered man of “sexual intimacy by fraud” for failing to
reveal his gender history to his girlfriend. 6 In contrast, a grand jury in New Jersey sided with those who call lying to obtain sex an act of lawful seduction when
it refused to indict a man for sexual assault for having sex with his fiancée after
lying about his nationality, profession, and marital status. 7 In response, New
Jersey Assemblyman Troy Singleton sought to amend the state’s rape laws to
include a crime of sex obtained by fraud or deception. 8 Assemblyman Singleton
challenged those who opposed the bill to ask themselves: should the law “afford
less legal protection to a person’s body than it does to that person’s property?” 9
After all, he asked, “if it is a crime to deceive individuals out of their property,
how can it be lawful to deceive them out of their bodies?” 10 The criminal case
and subsequent bill sparked a national conversation and a healthy dose of
scholarly commentary on the limits of rape law and the fuzzy line between
permissible sex and unlawful rape. 11
5.

Jeffrey Heller, Israel Jails Arab in “Sex Through Fraud” Case, REUTERS (July 21,
2010, 8:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-sex-idUSTRE66K2EG
20100721 [http://perma.cc/Z5XH-ALXE].

6.

Sex Fraud Woman Put on Probation, BBC (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-22078298 [http://perma.cc/566WRLA7].

7.

Most U.S. states do not generally criminalize sex by fraud. Instead, the majority
criminalize deception that amounts to “fraud in the factum” as opposed to “fraud
in the inducement.” Fraud in the factum occurs when the defendant’s deception
causes the victim to believe that she is consenting to an act that is not sexual intercourse. The classic example is that of a physician who tells the victim that he will
insert a medical instrument inside her vagina and instead sexually penetrates her.
In contrast, fraud in the inducement takes place when the defendant’s deception
persuades the victim to have sex, but does not cause the victim to believe that she
is consenting to something other than intercourse. For a more detailed discussion
of the distinction, see infra Section IV.C.

8.

Matt Friedman, Rape by Fraud? N.J. Lawmaker Introduces Bill To Make it a Crime,
NJ.COM (Nov. 24, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/
11/rape_by_fraud_nj_lawmaker_introduces_bill_to_make_it_a_crime.html
[http://perma.cc/7VNM-TYG8]. For the text of the bill, see A. 3908, 216th Leg.,
(N.J. 2014), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A4000/3908_I1.PDF [http://
perma.cc/KTM9-MH7T].

9.

Sexual Assault and the Evolution of Modern Law, SUPPORT ASSEMBLYMAN TROY
SINGLETON (May 7, 2015), www.troysingleton.com/sexual_assault_and_the_
evolution_of_modern_law [http://perma.cc/YQ9P-3F2H].

10.

Id.

11.

For discussions of the New Jersey rape-by-deception bill in the media, see Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Lying to a Lover Could Become ‘Rape’ in New Jersey, REASON
(Nov. 25, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2014/11/25/lying-to-get-someonein-bed-could-be-cri [http://perma.cc/Y2DX-7GLG]; Friedman, supra note 8;
409

SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

35 : 407

2017

Why is it so difficult to classify sex obtained by lies as either lawful seduction or criminal sexual assault? In an influential recent article titled The Riddle
of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, Professor Jed Rubenfeld suggested that our ambivalence towards punishing sex by deception is the
product of a deep fissure in current rape law. 12 More specifically, he claimed
that the refusal to broadly criminalize sex by deception is in tension with the
modern conception of rape as unconsented-to sex. If modern rape laws define
rape as sex without consent, why does sex that is obtained as a result of deception not satisfy the definition of the offense? Expressed in more general terms, if
contemporary rape statutes seek to protect sexual autonomy, why do these laws
leave sex by deception largely unpunished? After all, deception typically negates
consent outside of rape law, and choices that are the product of deception are
generally viewed to be incompatible with autonomy.
In light of this tension, Rubenfeld contends that contemporary rape reformers must grapple with what seems like an unsolvable riddle. If they want to
hold on to autonomy as the linchpin of rape law, they should broadly criminalize rape-by-deception. On the other hand, if they want to punish rape-bydeception only in exceptional cases, they should admit that rape statutes do not
primarily seek to enhance sexual autonomy. The challenge presented by this
riddle extends well beyond the narrow confines of rape-by-deception. If there
are strong reasons against broadly criminalizing sex obtained by fraud, and if
the selective criminalization of rape-by-deception is truly incompatible with the
modern definition of rape as nonconsensual sexual intercourse, then both the
definition of rape and the rationale that justifies its criminalization are in need
of a significant overhaul. The riddle of rape-by-deception thus threatens to unravel the theoretical edifice upon which contemporary rape law is built.
This Article argues that the riddle of rape-by-deception is based on a misunderstanding of the kind of autonomy that lies at the heart of modern rape reform statutes. Properly understood, the chief goal of contemporary rape laws is
to neutralize the coercion inherent in sexual relationships that take place in a
male-dominated society. Since minimizing deception is only tangentially related to this goal, respect for the kind of sexual autonomy that rape law is primarily designed to protect is compatible with selective criminalization of rape-bydeception. This solution to the riddle of rape-by-deception not only preserves
the conceptual framework that undergirds modern rape statutes, but also
sharpens our understanding of the interests that contemporary rape reform is
designed to protect.
Amanda Marcotte, The Drastic Overreach of the “Rape by Fraud” Bill, SLATE (Nov.
25, 2014, 1:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/11/25/_rape_by
_fraud_bill_in_new_jersey_bad_for_legitimate_sexual_assault_legislation.html
[http://perma.cc/DM6V-35GT]. For scholarly discussions regarding rape-bydeception, see Collection, Responses to Jed Rubenfeld’s Riddle of Rape-ByDeception, 123 YALE L.J. F. 321 (2013).
12.
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The argument proceeds in four parts. In order to set the stage for a discussion of the kind of autonomy that undergirds modern rape reform and Rubenfeld’s formulation of the riddle of rape-by-deception, Part I explores the nature
and scope of autonomy both outside and within rape law. What emerges is a
variety of changing and competing conceptions of consent that promote different degrees of autonomy depending on the circumstances and the conflicting
interests at stake in any given interaction.
Part II shows that comprehending the multidimensional nature of consent
and autonomy sharpens our understanding of the core commitments underlying the modern rape reform movement and contemporary scholarship on rape
law. A close reading of this literature, along with an understanding of the historical and cultural backdrop against which rape scholars were working at the
time, reveals that modern rape reformers were chiefly interested in changing
social and legal views regarding the kinds of pressures that ought to vitiate consent to sex. That is, modern rape reform was primarily about securing added
(female) freedom from (male) coercion, both subtle and overt, and expanding
the meaning of coercion beyond the patriarchal notion of physical force. More
broadly, feminist rape scholarship highlighted the inherently coercive nature of
all sex in a patriarchal society, thus calling into question the possibility of any
kind of consensual intercourse in a male-dominated culture.
Part III solves the riddle of rape-by-deception. It argues that much of the
confusion surrounding rape law in general and the riddle of rape-by-deception
in particular is the product of a fundamental misunderstanding of the conceptual nature of autonomy and consent and of the kind of autonomy that lies at
the heart of the modern rape reform movement. 13 More specifically, the failure
13.

Consent in rape law generates much confusion, including the classic confusion
regarding whether consent ought to be viewed primarily as a mental state, such as
subjectively wanting to engage in a certain act, or as a performative act that externally communicates willingness to engage in certain conduct. For a lucid analysis
of the confusion generated by these competing views of consent, see Aya Gruber,
Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (2016).
While it is important to address this confusion, the conception of consent advanced in this Article holds regardless of whether consent is viewed as a mental
state or as an act that communicates acquiescence. To determine the moral import
of a mental state such as desiring to engage in certain conduct, it is necessary to
examine whether the desire was a product of coercion, whether it was formed on
the basis of faulty information, and whether the subject was competent enough for
the desire to have moral or legal weight. Regarding scalarity, desires that are the
product of less coercion, heightened information, and maximal competency are
more robust than desires that are the consequence of more coercion, less information, and diminished competency. The same can be said about the view of consent as an external act that communicates agreement. To assess the weight that will
be placed on an external manifestation of agreement, one must consider the extent
to which the communication was coerced, sufficiently informed, and competent.
Communications that are less coerced, more informed, and maximally competent
are more robust than manifestations that are more coerced, less informed, and
minimally competent. Given that the claims regarding the multidimensionality
411
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to grasp that modern rape reform primarily focused on enhancing the noncoercive dimension of autonomy prevents scholars from appreciating that
drawing lines in the context of rape-by-deception serves to recognize different
spheres and degrees of autonomy rather than to undermine the concept of autonomy writ large. Once this is fully appreciated, there is little tension between
opposing the broad criminalization of sex by deception and the kind of sexual
autonomy that lies at the core of contemporary rape reform.
After solving the so-called riddle of rape-by-deception, Part IV suggests
some framing principles that can provide guidance to courts and legislatures
when deciding whether to criminalize sex obtained by deception. Without intending to exhaustively cover all of the cases in which it is sensible to punish sex
obtained by misrepresentations, I argue that obvious candidates for criminalization are cases that feature deception that is also coercive, deception that
amounts to a breach of trust by a person in a position of authority, and deception that causes significant harm in addition to the infringement of the victim’s
autonomy. The suggested approach would only selectively criminalize sex obtained by deception. Contrary to what Rubenfeld suggests, such selective criminalization is not in tension with the kind of sexual autonomy that modern rape
statutes seek to protect. As a result, the so-called riddle of rape-by-deception
turns out not to be much of a riddle at all.
I.

Autonomy, Consent, and the Riddle of Rape-by-Deception
A. The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception

According to Professor Jed Rubenfeld, the widespread resistance to criminalizing rape by fraud reveals a deep tension in modern rape law and scholarship. 14 In his view, modern approaches to sexual assault law view the crime of
rape as an affront to the victim’s sexual autonomy. 15 This view of rape inspired
many scholars and reformers to argue that rape should be regarded as a crime
against (sexual) freedom instead of as a crime of (physical) violence. 16 By focusing on the injury to the victim’s sexual autonomy, these scholars argued with
some success that the force requirement should be dropped from rape statutes,
given that the essence of the crime is not forcible sex but rather nonconsensual
sex. 17

and scalarity of consent do not depend on whether consent is viewed as a mental
state or as a communicative act, this Article takes no position regarding whether
consent ought to be viewed as a mental or performative act.
14.

Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1379.

15.

Id.

16.

See generally Stephen Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and
Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35 (1992).

17.

Id. at 77.
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Shifting the focus of rape from violence to autonomy allowed scholars to
argue that rape should be redefined as engaging in sex without consent. 18 But—
as Rubenfeld cleverly argues—this superficially unimpeachable view of rape as a
crime against sexual autonomy generates what appears to be an irresolvable
riddle. 19 If rape is defined as engaging in sex without consent, then it seems to
logically follow that sex obtained by deception ought to be considered rape. After all, deception invalidates consent in many legal contexts, both civil and
criminal. 20 Fraudulent consent deprives contracts of efficacy, transforms an
otherwise lawful taking of property into criminal theft, and gives rise to tort liability for medical malpractice. Nevertheless, sex obtained by fraud does not
usually amount to a crime under the vast majority of post-reform rape statutes
and is not generally viewed as criminal in most contemporary accounts of
rape. 21
Rubenfeld argues that contemporary rape scholars and reformers cannot
argue that rape is a crime against sexual autonomy that ought to be defined as
having sex without consent while simultaneously refusing to endorse broad
criminalization of rape by fraud. 22 If such scholars and reformers are truly
committed to the idea of sexual autonomy, logic should compel them to punish
all sex obtained by deception. 23 If they refuse to do so—as many have done—
then they must abandon sexual autonomy as the linchpin of rape law. 24 Either
way, contemporary rape reformers and scholars are in a bind. Rubenfeld suggests that the way out of the bind is by acknowledging that rape law is not truly
about sexual autonomy. Instead, he argues that rape is a crime against the victim’s right to be in control of her own body. 25 Given that people who agree to
have sex because of fraudulent misrepresentations maintain control over their

18.

While defining rape as “sex without consent” may seem unremarkable to most
people, rape has historically been defined in the United States as having forcible
sexual intercourse rather than having nonconsensual sexual intercourse. As a result, non-forcible sex has historically not been considered rape even if the sex is
nonconsensual. Id.

19.

See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1395–98.

20.

In order to invalidate consent, the deception must be “material” according to
whatever standard of materiality applies. For a detailed discussion of different
standards of materiality, see infra Section III.B.

21.

See, e.g., B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by Fraud or Impersonation, 91 A.L.R. 2d
591 § 2 (1963) (“[T]he prevailing view is that upon proof that consent to intercourse was given, even though [procured by fraud], a prosecution for rape cannot
be maintained.”).

22.

Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1380.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Rubenfeld calls this right the right to “self-possession.” Id. at 1426.
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bodies while they are having sex, Rubenfeld concludes that rape by fraud should
not be criminalized. 26
In what follows, I will show that, while smart and imaginative, Rubenfeld’s
account of rape law is wrong for two reasons. First, he fails to appreciate that
consent and autonomy are scalar and multidimensional concepts that can be
present to a greater or lesser degree. As a result, he is unable to perceive that the
fact that rape law does not protect autonomy as much as other areas of law does
not mean that rape law does not seek to enhance autonomy. Additionally,
Rubenfeld misapprehends the nature of modern rape scholarship and reform,
suggesting that the conceptual underpinnings of contemporary rape reform and
scholarship commit them to the criminalization of rape by fraud when it really
does not. The core of the modern rape reform movement had little to do with
the informational dimension of consent, which is implicated in cases of rapeby-deception. Instead, as I show in Part II, contemporary rape scholarship has
primarily focused on the inherently coercive nature of sexual interactions in a
male-dominated society. Once this comes into full view, there is little contradiction between the commitment to sexual freedom displayed by rape reformers
and scholars and their reticence to broadly criminalize rape by fraud.
To better understand the challenges posed by the riddle of rape-bydeception and to identify a solution, the remainder of this Part examines the
kinds of autonomy and consent that lie at the heart of modern rape statutes. To
do so, I first explain why autonomy is central to our understanding of contemporary sexual assault laws. I then flesh out the connection between the philosophical concept of autonomy and the legal doctrine of consent. Finally, I distinguish autonomy from the related concept of freedom and point out that
autonomy is both multidimensional and scalar. As I demonstrate in Parts II and
III, both of these insights will prove essential to solving the riddle of rape-bydeception.

26.

Most of the responses to Rubenfeld’s article focus on arguing against his turn to
self-possession without calling into question whether rape-by-deception actually
presents a riddle. See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, Sex, Lies and Law: Rethinking Rape-byFraud, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON STATE POWER: CONSENT AND CONTROL 152, 166
(Chris Ashford et al. eds., 2016); Dougherty, supra note 4; Patricia J. Falk, Not Logic, but Experience: Drawing on Lessons from the Real World in Thinking About the
Riddle of Rape-by-Fraud, 123 YALE L.J. F. 353, 365 (2013) (“Rubenfeld is clearly correct when he observes that the cases of rape-by-fraud pose a riddle not susceptible
of easy solution.”).
While I also disagree with Rubenfeld’s view of rape as a crime against selfpossession, the challenge that I undertake in this Article is to show that once the
notions of consent and autonomy that undergird modern rape law are understood, rape-by-deception does not generate a riddle. Unlike previous responses,
my critique thus goes to the core of Rubenfeld’s argument: if there is no real riddle
of rape-by-deception there is no need to turn to self-possession.
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B. The Importance of Autonomy and Consent to Contemporary Rape Law
and to the Riddle of Rape-by-Deception
Autonomy and consent are central to contemporary rape doctrine. Judicial
and scholarly writings on modern rape law are rife with references to both concepts. In an oft-cited case, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a definition
of sexual assault that required proof of victim resistance because “such a regime
would be inconsistent with modern principles of personal autonomy.” 27 Instead, the court held, the only definition of rape that is compatible with respect
for autonomy is one that requires “consent” to sex that is expressed in the form
of an “affirmative and freely-given permission” to engage in intercourse. 28 Sexual autonomy and consent also lie at the core of many modern scholarly accounts of rape law. Professor Stephen Schulhofer—one of the most influential
contemporary rape law scholars and Chief Reporter of the Model Penal Code’s
draft revised sexual assault statute—developed a conception of sexual assault
that highlights “sexual autonomy as a distinctive constituent of personhood and
freedom.” 29 Once we view rape as an offense against sexual autonomy, Schulhofer argues, “intercourse without consent . . . would be unambiguously prohibited,” “even in the complete absence of force.” 30
Unsurprisingly, Rubenfeld’s formulation of the riddle of rape-by-deception
also relies heavily on conceptions of autonomy and consent. Expressed in terms
of autonomy, the challenge posed by the riddle is that contemporary rape reform’s refusal to broadly criminalize sex obtained by deception is incompatible
with its commitment to sexual autonomy. In terms of consent, the riddle reveals an apparent tension between modern rape reform’s redefinition of rape as
“sex without consent” and its failure to generally criminalize sex obtained by
misrepresentations. More broadly, the riddle questions whether it is coherent to
hold that engaging in sex without consent is wrong because it is a violation of
autonomy while simultaneously holding that sex by deception should not be
generally criminalized.
Predictably, responses to the riddle of rape-by-deception also traffic heavily
on particular—and sometimes idiosyncratic—conceptions of autonomy and
consent. In her response to Rubenfeld, Professor Vera Bergelson concedes that
obtaining sex by material deception is a violation of autonomy, but then suggests that sometimes the violation is not significant enough to warrant the imposition of punishment. 31 But it is unclear if Bergelson can escape from the rid-

27.

State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992).

28.

Id.

29.

Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 35. The most recent revised draft of the Model Penal
Code sexual assault provision is Section 213.0(3). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3)
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).

30.

Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 72.

31.

Bergelson, supra note 26, at 169–70.
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dle’s grip once she makes this concession. An obvious reply—and one that is
frequently deployed by Rubenfeld—is that if theft law broadly criminalizes takings obtained by deception because such takings violate the property owner’s
autonomy, shouldn’t rape law at least match this policy? 32 This response is especially strong given that sexual autonomy is seen as at least as valuable—if not
more valuable—than autonomy regarding property. 33 As Professor Tom
Dougherty notes, given that material misrepresentation “routinely vitiates consent in cases involving larceny, trespass, and contract,” refusing to criminalize
such misrepresentations in the sexual consent context seems “arbitrary and
unmotivated.” 34
Professor Dougherty’s commitment to a certain conception of autonomy
causes him to feel the rational pull of the riddle even more than Bergelson. According to Dougherty, “sex law [has] to pick its poison—to decide if it does or
doesn’t stand for sexual autonomy” by either “embracing rape-by-deception or
reconsidering . . . a right to sexual autonomy.” 35 He then argues for the latter,
claiming that “tak[ing] autonomy seriously” should lead to “adopt[ing] a more
expansive conception of rape-by-deception,” even when doing so leads to “reluctantly accept[ing] that someone can be guilty of rape-by-deception by falsely
saying he went to Yale.” 36 Dougherty’s solution is logically sound but normatively unattractive. In arguing that it is rape to obtain sex by lying about going
to Yale, Dougherty cheapens the significance of rape without getting anything
in return other than avoiding falling prey to the riddle of rape-by-deception.
This is surely too steep a price to pay for escaping the grip of Rubenfeld’s argument.
A certain conception of sexual autonomy is also at the core of Professor Patricia Falk’s response to the riddle of rape by fraud. Falk—the scholar who has
devoted the most attention to the problem of rape-by-deception 37—
acknowledges that “Rubenfeld is clearly correct when he observes that the cases
of rape-by-fraud pose a riddle not susceptible of easy solution.” 38 Falk suggests
that “the riddle of rape-by-fraud cases should be unraveled by retaining sexual
32.

Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1432–33.

33.

One way of surmising that sexual autonomy is of more value than autonomy regarding property is by comparing the punishment of rape with the punishment of
theft. All factors being equal, rape is punished considerably more harshly than
theft. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF
DESERT 362–67 (2013) (citing several studies that demonstrate that rape is punished
more severely than theft).

34.

Dougherty, supra note 4, at 322.

35.

Id. at 334 (citing Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1379–80).

36.

Id. at 333–34.

37.

See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39
(1998).

38.

Falk, supra note 26, at 365.
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autonomy as the foundation of modern rape law, understanding the limits on
the right of sexual autonomy, and developing a more robust understanding of
which types of fraudulent (or deceptive) representations violate our right to
sexual autonomy and which do not.” 39 But it is unclear if Falk can nonarbitrarily distinguish between deception that violates sexual autonomy and deception that does not, especially given that she fails to provide a standard for
coherently discriminating between deceptions that infringe autonomy and
those that do not.
Regardless of the different ways in which Bergelson, Dougherty, and Falk
try to solve Rubenfeld’s puzzle, these scholars agree that there is something
deeply problematic about our reluctance to broadly criminalize sex obtained by
deception. Bergelson rejects Rubenfeld’s self-possession argument but she
“completely share[s]” the concern that rape-by-deception poses serious linedrawing problems if the violation of the victim’s sexual autonomy is the basis
for punishing rape. 40 Dougherty considers the riddle to be “fundamentally
sound” and therefore “feel[s] the full force of Rubenfeld’s powerful argument.” 41 Falk concedes that Rubenfeld is “clearly correct” to point out that the
selective criminalization of rape-by-deception generates a riddle. 42 These scholars worry greatly that refusing to broadly punish sex obtained by deception is
incompatible with both consent and autonomy.
In the remainder of this Article, I show that this worry is misplaced because
it is based on a faulty conception of how consent and autonomy work in different domains of law and morality, and—as a result—of how these concepts actually operate in the context of rape law. In order to bear out this claim, this
Part fleshes out the nature and scope of autonomy and consent both within and
outside of sexual assault doctrine. The result will be a more nuanced view of
consent and autonomy than the one that is generally presupposed by most rape
scholars. It is a view that shows that—contrary to what Rubenfeld and others
suggest—consent and autonomy can, and frequently do, coexist with certain
kinds and degrees of deception. As I demonstrate in Parts III and IV, this will
make it easier to appreciate that deception is not incompatible with the kind of
autonomy and consent that modern rape statutes are designed to protect.
C. The Connection Between Consent and Autonomy
Consent is often described as an all-or-nothing proposition: 43 either there is
full consent or there is no consent at all. There is little conceptual breathing
39.

Id.

40.

Bergelson, supra note 26, at 166.

41.

Dougherty, supra note 4, at 331, 334.

42.

Falk, supra note 26, at 365.

43.

See, e.g., Adam Kolber, Smoothing Vague Laws, in VAGUENESS AND LAW:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 275, 286 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds.,
2016).
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room in law for the notion of partial consent. 44 If a person consents to someone
else taking her property, the taking is lawful and, therefore, does not amount to
theft. 45 By the same token, if a person consents to sexual intercourse with another person, the sex is lawful and, consequently, is not sexual assault or rape. 46
The same logic holds in the policing context, where a consented search is reasonable and, as a result, lawful under the Fourth Amendment. 47 There are, of
course, circumstances in which consent is deemed legally ineffective. For example, a mentally ill person’s consent to giving another his property is invalid. 48
Consent to sexual intercourse is not effective when given by a minor under the
legal age of consent. 49 A police search is unlawful if consent was obtained as a
result of coercion. 50
Still, these circumstances serve to fully invalidate consent. If the relevant
circumstances are present to the required degree, there is no consent at all. On
the other hand, if the circumstances do not meet the relevant legal threshold for
invalidating consent, then there is full consent. This is the case even if the circumstances come close to meeting the threshold but fall just short. If, for example, the taking of property is consented to by a mentally ill person who is
deemed to be just above the legal standard for competency, the taking does not
amount to theft because it is fully consented to. Similarly, if the person who
consents to sexual intercourse is one hour older than the legal age for consent,
the conduct is fully consented to and does not constitute sexual assault.
In contrast to the all-or-nothing nature of consent, the related concepts of
autonomy and freedom are typically described as forming part of a continuum.
It is common to talk about more or less autonomy and about increasing or diminishing freedom. All things being equal, it is sensible to say that a teenager’s
choices are more autonomous than those of a toddler but less autonomous than

44.

It is possible for a party to consent to some act but not consent to some other related act. For example, a woman may consent to kissing but not to sexual intercourse. While one could describe these cases as ones of partial consent, it is better
to treat them as cases involving full consent to one thing (kissing) and a lack of
consent to the other (sexual intercourse). To claim that the woman who consents
to a kiss “partially” consents to intercourse is both descriptively false and normatively unappealing.

45.

See, e.g., State v. Maxon, 79 P.3d. 202, 209 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that theft is
consummated when “control [is] exercised over property of another without the
consent of the owner”).

46.

Vermont’s Penal Code, for example, defines sexual assault as engaging in a sexual
act “without the consent of the other person.” VT. STAT. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (2017).

47.

See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

48.

See, e.g., ANNE E. MELLEY, MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE § 73 (2017) (explaining
that mentally ill individuals are not competent to gift their property).

49.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(3) (2017).

50.

See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
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those of an adult. We can also talk about convicts on probation having less
freedom than non-convicted citizens but more freedom than imprisoned convicts.
The all-or-nothing nature of consent is difficult to square with the scalar
nature of autonomy and freedom. After all, consent is the currency with which
the law cashes out expressions of autonomy and freedom. That is, consent is the
tool that law most commonly deploys in order to operationalize conceptions of
freedom and autonomy. If a person consents to a taking of her property, that is
typically taken to mean that the person exercised her autonomy with regard to
her property. Similarly, consent to sex generally implies that the person was free
to not engage in sex.
But if consent and autonomy are so intimately related, why is it that the law
approaches consent in an all-or-nothing fashion while morality approaches autonomy and freedom in a more scalar way? If autonomy and freedom lie on a
spectrum, why does consent not also lie on a similar spectrum?
The obvious answer is that the law often needs to adopt bright line rules in
order to precisify vague moral standards. In the context of consent, courts and
legislatures have pragmatic reasons for adopting an all-or-nothing conception
of consent that serves as a rough proxy for the more scalar concepts of freedom
and autonomy. As such, consent signals whatever minimum level of freedom
and autonomy the legal system deems sufficient to legitimize a certain interaction or exchange.
However, there is more to the story than this. While the law largely refuses
to describe consent as falling along a spectrum that goes from fully consensual
to partially consensual to nonconsensual, consent is in fact defined in different
ways depending on the context. In some contexts, such as medical malpractice
law, consent is defined in a very robust way. 51 In others—like consent to police
searches in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—consent takes a weaker form. 52
In between these two extremes, consent is defined in weaker and stronger ways
depending on the context and on the particular dimension of consent that the
law focuses on. The end result is a varied and multifaceted approach to consent
that belies what at first blush appears as a monolithic all-or-nothing view of
consensuality.
If the law wants to require that robust autonomy be exercised before an interaction or exchange is deemed legally valid, it adopts a more stringent definition of consent. Medical malpractice is the paradigmatic example. If, on the
51.

Consent in the medical malpractice context requires that the patient be informed
of all material risks inherent in treatment. See, e.g., Martin by Scoptur v. Richards,
531 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Wis. 1995).

52.

Consent in the Fourth Amendment context needs to be uncoerced but does not
need to be informed. See United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220, 1222 (6th Cir.
1976) (stating that “[the agent’s] stratagem in posing as a ‘helper’ to the Addressograph-Multigraph representative who had been asked by defendants to help sell a
portion of their press was legitimate police activity in pursuance of an investigative
lead and not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment”).
419

SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

35 : 407

2017

other hand, the law wants to deem an interaction legally valid with only a minimal degree of autonomy being exercised, the law will adopt a weaker consent
standard. This is the case with consent to police searches. The law’s more nuanced approach to consent is masked by the fact that the law uses the term
“consent” in all of these varied contexts even though the term often means different things depending on the circumstances.
In what follows, I explore in considerable detail the nature of autonomy
and consent and the connection between them. What emerges is a kaleidoscopic approach to consent that suggests that consent in law—much like the moral
concepts of autonomy and freedom—lies on a continuum that ranges from
quite robust to extremely weak varieties of consent. The idea of a spectrum of
consent ranging from strong to weak packs a considerable explanatory punch,
as it illuminates the chameleon-like nature of consent while simultaneously
shedding light on the kinds of autonomy and freedom that lie at the heart of
different legal doctrines.
D. An Autonomy Primer
Autonomy is defined in diverse ways by different scholars. As such, there is
no universally agreed upon definition of the term. Nevertheless, there are certain features that lie at the core of most conceptions of autonomy. Perhaps the
most central of these is the idea that to be autonomous is to be capable of “selfrule” or of governing oneself. To govern oneself requires having the capacity to
reflect and revise one’s identity and values. 53 Under this approach, choices are
autonomous when they reflect preferences, values, and identities that we have
embraced as our own. 54 This is essentially the view of philosopher Gerald
Dworkin, who defines autonomy “as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth
and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher order
preferences and values.” 55
This conception of autonomy requires the existence of two capacities. First,
an autonomous being must be capable of assessing and criticizing one’s preferences and desires. Second, autonomy requires the capacity to either accept one’s
existing preferences or desires or to try to change or revise them so that they
better reflect one’s higher order values. An example helps illustrate these two
capacities. As I write these lines, I realize that I wish to eat sweets. I am not particularly thrilled by this realization, given that I am currently on a low carbohydrate diet. In light of my higher order commitment to healthy eating, I am cur53.

See generally John Christman, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Self-Transformation, 27
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 185 (2001).

54.

This is the view espoused by Harry G. Frankfurt in his seminal essay. See Harry G.
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in THE IMPORTANCE OF
WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 11 (1988).

55.

GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988).
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rently doing my best to stave off the desire to consume sweets. Even more, I am
trying to abandon my desire to eat sweets and substitute it with one that is more
compatible with my commitment to a healthier lifestyle, such as eating nuts.
This thought process is reflective of autonomy, since it displays both the capacity to critically assess my preferences and desires and the capacity to revise them
in order to make them more compatible with higher order commitments.
E. Autonomy and Freedom Distinguished
While the terms “autonomy” and “freedom” are often used interchangeably, many philosophers differentiate between them. The most common way of
distinguishing the terms is by suggesting that autonomy is the capacity for selfdetermination in accordance with one’s authentic or true values, whereas freedom (or liberty) 56 is the ability of a person to act without significant external
constraints. Freedom has been variously defined as “hav[ing] (significant) options that are not closed or made less eligible by the actions of other agents,” 57
as “freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something,” 58 and as “absence of interference.” 59 Given that freedom is usually defined as the absence of
significant external constraints on action, the typical forms of interference with
freedom are the use of force and coercion. 60 In contrast with freedom, autonomy requires more than absence of coercion, since the concept is related to the
more robust idea of “being a subject, of being more than a passive spectator of
one’s desire’s and feelings.” 61 In addition to our choices not being interfered
with, autonomy requires that one be in charge of one’s values, desires, and preferences.
As defined here, freedom is typically a precondition for exercising our autonomy. 62 It is difficult to be moved into action by one’s freely chosen values
and dispositions if one’s choices are significantly constrained by external factors, such as force or coercion. Therefore, “the typical ways of interfering with
56.

I use the terms “freedom” and “liberty” interchangeably.

57.

DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 14.

58.

Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 314
(1967).

59.

DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 107 (noting that liberty “is conceived either as mere
absence of interference or as the presence of alternatives”).

60.

Id. at 14.

61.

Id. at 107.

62.

While it is arguable that freedom is a necessary condition for autonomy, some
scholars have suggested that it is not. The paradigmatic example is that of Odysseus, who elects to have his freedom restricted when he faces the songs of the sirens. In that case, the restriction of freedom actually maximizes Odysseus’ autonomy. See id. at 106.
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the liberty of an agent seem to also interfere with her autonomy.” 63 In contrast,
many interferences with autonomy do not also interfere with freedom. The paradigmatic example is that of deception. A person who chooses to act in a certain
way because she was deceived has her autonomy undermined without having
her freedom constrained in any significant way. Accordingly, Dworkin points
out that “[d]eception is not a way of restricting liberty.” 64 He gives the example
of a “person who is put into a prison cell and told that all the doors are
locked.” 65 Since the doors are not really locked, this person is “free to leave the
cell.” 66 However, since “he cannot—given his information—avail himself of
this opportunity, his ability to do what he wishes is limited.” 67 This shows that
“self-determination can be limited without limiting liberty.” 68 That is, autonomy can be undermined in ways that go beyond interferences with freedom.
The distinction between freedom and autonomy is sometimes of considerable explanatory power. This is the case with rape law, where—as I will show in
Parts II and III—the law is primarily designed to protect freedom rather than
autonomy.
F. The Multidimensional Nature of Autonomy
Properly understood, autonomy can be measured along the dimensions of
non-coercion, competency, and information. Regarding the first of these dimensions, since freedom is typically a condition for autonomy, 69 an important
feature of autonomous conduct is the absence of coercion. Coercion can take
many forms, although it is usually associated with the use or threat of use of
physical force against a person. Beyond this classic case, there are also psychological forms of coercion that range from hypnotism, to social conditioning, to
the use of emotional and social isolation techniques. Coercion can also take
economic form, such as when a person compels another to act by threatening to
withdraw certain economic benefits or by terminating her employment. 70
In addition to the lack of external coercion, certain “competency” conditions must be satisfied for conduct to be autonomous. As discussed in the previous section, these conditions include the capacity for exercising minimal ra-

63.

Id. It is worth noting that Dworkin treats “freedom” and “liberty” as synonyms.

64.

Id. at 14.

65.

Id. at 105.

66.

Id.

67.

Id. at 14.

68.

Id. at 105.

69.

For the rare instance in which freedom may not be a condition for autonomy, see
supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.

70.

For the definitive treatment of coercion, see generally ALAN WERTHEIMER,
COERCION (1987).
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tionality and the absence of debilitating mental illness. The former is absent in
very young children and develops slowly as we mature. Intoxication may induce
a state in which minimal rationality is absent. Debilitating mental illness prevents a person from behaving autonomously if it significantly impairs his capacity to behave rationally. These capacities combine to create what I call the
“competency” dimension of autonomy.
Conduct also needs to be sufficiently informed in order to qualify as autonomous. As Beauchamp and Childress point out, “[p]ersonal autonomy encompasses, at a minimum, self-rule that is free . . . from certain limitations such as
an inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice.” 71 This captures
what I call the “informational” dimension of autonomy. Pursuant to this informational dimension, an autonomous choice is one that is “fully informed.” 72
Thus, “[a]n action cannot be autonomous if the actor fails to have an understanding of his or her action.” 73 The kind of understanding that is relevant to
the informational dimension of autonomy is that which allows the person to
“understand the nature and implications of his or her actions” 74 and to appreciate the “foreseeable consequences and possible outcomes that might follow as a
result of performing and not performing the action.” 75
In combination with the non-coercion and competency conditions, this informational component rounds out the three classic dimensions of autonomy.
All three dimensions must be present to a certain degree in order for conduct to
be considered autonomous. 76
G. The Scalar Nature of Autonomy
In addition to being multidimensional, autonomy is scalar. That is, autonomy can be present in different degrees. Some actions may be considered more
autonomous, while others may be considered less so. Autonomy, then, lies on a
spectrum that ranges from full autonomy to complete lack of autonomy. In between these two extremes, there are multiple intermediate degrees of autonomy.
Although there is scant reference to the scalar nature of autonomy in the
literature, a handful of scholars have highlighted this feature. Ruth Faden and

71.

TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES
(5th ed. 2001).

72.

Onora O’Neill, The Inaugural Address: Autonomy: The Emperor’s New Clothes, 77
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 1, 5 (2003).

73.

RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
CONSENT 248 (1986).

74.

Id. at 250.

75.

Id. at 151.

76.

For a similar definition of autonomous action, see David Archard, Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 19, 21 (2008) (defining an
autonomous act as one that is “informed, voluntary and rational”).
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Tom Beauchamp, for example, argue that autonomy comes in degrees because
some of the conditions that undergird it “may be placed on a broad continuum
from fully present to wholly absent.” 77 In order to better understand the scalar
nature of autonomy, Faden and Beauchamp suggest beginning with a hypothetical case of completely autonomous conduct. 78 A fully autonomous action is
conduct “that is fully understood and completely noncontrolled by the influences of others.” 79 In these cases, “lack of understanding and control by others
do not prevail in any degree.” 80 The degree of autonomy exhibited by a certain
choice wanes as we begin to strip away the understanding, control, and information with which the action is performed. 81 Eventually, the “pieces of the interlocking machinery are eroded” so that “the resultant action increasingly becomes less autonomous” until “[w]ith sufficient stripping the behavior becomes
nonautonomous.” 82
Faden and Beauchamp recognize that there will often be practical reasons
that require identifying a particular cutoff point for autonomous action. 83 This
will frequently be the case in legal contexts, where courts must decide whether a
particular interaction is sufficiently autonomous to be considered legally efficacious. In order to do so, it will be “necessary to establish thresholds above which
all acts are treated as autonomous and below which all acts are treated as nonautonomous.” 84 This line drawing exercise will necessarily be “based on moral
and policy considerations,” given that “no sharp line can be drawn purely on
conceptual grounds to distinguish autonomous from nonautonomous action.” 85
It is important to note that the fact that lines will often need to be drawn
between autonomous and non-autonomous acts does not undermine either the
conceptual claim that autonomy is a scalar notion nor the practical import of
locating autonomy within a continuum. The scalar nature of autonomy is essential to understanding why courts define consent in certain contexts differently than in others. Such disparities occur because courts draw the line between autonomy and non-autonomy at different points within the spectrum of
autonomous action depending on the circumstances and the competing interests at stake in any given situation.
77.

FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 73, at 238. More specifically, they argue that the
condition of non-control and condition of understanding lie on spectrum.

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

Id. at 238–39.

81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 239.

83.

See id. at 240.

84.

Id.

85.

Id.
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Not only is autonomy a scalar concept, but the specific components of autonomy are scalar as well. Therefore, the three dimensions of autonomy that I
have identified are capable of manifesting themselves in a more or less robust
fashion.
Like autonomy itself, the non-coercive dimension of autonomy comes in
degrees. Choices can be more or less coerced depending on the circumstances of
the case. As Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explains, “the degree of coercion varies
with the amount of harm that is threatened as well as the probability of escaping harm if you don’t comply with the demand.” 86 Given that coercion is scalar
and that it is a dimension of autonomy, the degree of autonomy exhibited by an
action will vary depending on the amount of coercion that is present in the case.
As Faden and Beauchamp indicate, “[t]he form of control exerted by the influence attempts of others also affects the degree to which an action is autonomous.” 87 If “there are degrees of threats and degrees of abilities to resist
threats,” then it must be “that some threats render actions more nonautonomous than others.” 88
The competency dimension of autonomy is also a matter of degrees. That
is, a person may be more or less competent to exercise meaningful autonomy in
different circumstances. As Faden and Beauchamp point out, “[p]ersons may
be judged more or less competent to the extent they possess a certain level of
ability or number of abilities.” 89 As an illustration of this notion, they suggest
that “an experienced surgeon is likely to be more competent to consent to surgery than a frightened young soldier.” 90 What emerges is a “continuum of
competence” that ranges “without discernible breaks from full competence
through various levels of partial competence to full incompetence.” 91
Finally, the informational dimension of autonomy is also scalar. Depending
on the amount of information available, a choice will range from fully informed
to completely uninformed. The degree of autonomy that obtains in any given
situation is directly proportional to the amount of information that the agent
has prior to acting. 92 As the quantity and quality of the information in posses86.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Free Contrastivism, in CONTRASTIVISM IN PHILOSOPHY
134, 148 (Martijn Blaauw ed., 2013).

87.

FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 73, at 239.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 289.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

The degrees of informational autonomy have been well documented in the medical context, where it has been pointed out that “patient competence to understand
and participate in medical decision making comes in a spectrum, from the essentially nonexistent to the marginal to the well-informed and reflective.” STEPHEN
WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT: PATIENT AUTONOMY AND CLINICIAN BENEFICENCE
WITHIN HEALTH CARE 82 (2d ed. 1998). Depending on the risks inherent in treatment and on the potential of confusion that may be generated by providing addi425
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sion of the agent diminishes, the degree of autonomy that can be exhibited decreases as well. In contrast, “the more information a person understands, the
more enhanced are the possibilities for autonomy of action.” 93
H. From Autonomy to Consent
Consent is the vehicle through which legal actors translate concerns about
autonomy into legally workable standards and rules. As a result, courts and legislatures interested in enhancing autonomy will frequently require that the relevant interaction be consensual in order for it to be legally efficacious. 94 Consent
is essential for deciding issues that are as varied as the validity of a contract, the
rules governing medical malpractice, the takings of property that amount to
theft, and the kinds of sexual intercourse that give rise to liability for sexual assault.
Given the strong link between consent and autonomy, one would expect
that consent—like autonomy—be multidimensional. This seems to be the case,
since coercion, competency, and information are all relevant to consent. That
coercion is relevant to consent is confirmed by the fact that coerced consent is
invalid in essentially every legally relevant context ranging from contracts to
rape law. Competency is also clearly part of the legal landscape of consent. Certain people are not competent to enter into contracts, engage in sexual intercourse, or consent to medical treatment. Finally, courts and legislatures frequently make reference to consent’s informational dimension. The most
obvious context is in medical malpractice, where courts often point out that patient consent must be adequately informed in order for medical treatment to be
lawful. Since consent can be assessed along the same three dimensions that
comprise autonomous conduct, there is little doubt about its multidimensional
nature.
Contrary to what may appear at first glance, consent—much like autonomy—exists along a spectrum. Consent can thus range from very robust to quite
weak. Consent in a certain case can be more or less coerced, competent, or informed than consent in a different case. If one focuses on the informational dimension of consent, for example, one can see that consent to medical treatment
is more robust along this dimension than consent to sex, even if it is equally robust with regard to the remaining two dimensions. 95
tional information, “a patient’s place within this spectrum will be more or less acceptable.” Id.
93.

FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 73, at 239.

94.

See sources cited supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.

95.

In any given case, the factfinder must find consent to either exist or not exist, according to the applicable legal standard. In this narrow sense, consent is all-ornothing rather than scalar. Nevertheless, consent is scalar in the broader sense that
the legal standards of consent range from quite robust in certain contexts (e.g.,
medical malpractice) to quite weak in other contexts (e.g., consensual police
searches). It is the latter kind of scalarity that is relevant for tackling Rubenfeld’s
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It is also possible for a certain kind of consent to be more robust along one
dimension while simultaneously less robust along another dimension than
some other kind of consent. This is the case with the kinds of consent required
by the criminal offenses of theft and sexual assault. Consent in the law of rape is
more robust than consent in the law of theft along the non-coercive dimension,
but less robust across the informational dimension. Regarding the non-coercive
dimension, modern sexual assault law often invalidates consent when it takes
place in the context of an inherently coercive circumstance. Coercion is deemed
inherent in the context of certain relationships, such as foster parent and foster
child, mental health therapist and patient, and teacher and student. 96 Assessing
the coercion inherent in a sexual relationship between a high school teacher and
one of his students, a court affirmed a sexual assault conviction stating: “[i]n
light of the disparity of power inherent in the teacher-student relationship, we
conclude that both victims were situated in an inherently coercive relationship
with the defendant wherein consent might not easily be refused.” 97 Referencing
the inherent coercion that exists between a superior and a subordinate, a federal
court held that “the nature of the relationship between [a lieutenant colonel]
and [a private first class] . . . is such that consent might not easily be refused.” 98
Courts have made similar statements regarding the coercion inherent in relationships between clergy and their followers 99 and between correctional staff
and the inmates under their supervision. 100
In many states it is also deemed inherently coercive for a minor who is otherwise capable of consent to have sex with someone who is older than her by a
certain amount of years. In Alaska, for example, it is a crime for someone who
is 16 years of age or older to have sex with someone who is under 13 years of
age. 101 More specifically, the statute contemplates that minors between 13 and 16
“riddle of rape-by-deception.” Rubenfeld claims that it is puzzling that deception
negates consent in theft law but not in rape law. As I will show in Part III, infra,
this claim is mistaken because consent is scalar in the sense that consent in certain
legal contexts demands more information, a lack of coercion, or competency than
in other contexts. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1432–33.
For a view that is sympathetic to the idea that consent is scalar, see Kolber,
supra note 43, at 266–88. While Kolber seems to believe that it is plausible to think
about consent as lying along a continuum, he does not do so by engaging in a multidimensional analysis of consent, as set forth in this Article.
96.

An example of such statutes is Georgia’s sexual assault law, which criminalizes sex
between a person who has supervisory or disciplinary authority and the individual
over whom she has authority. GA. CODE § 16-6-5.1 (2017).

97.

State v. McKenzie-Adams, 915 A.2d 822, 836 (Conn. 2007), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Payne, 34 A.3d 370 (Conn. 2012).

98.

Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 519 (2005).

99.

Talbert v. State, 239 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Ark. 2006).

100. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2003).
101.

ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434 (2017).
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years of age may consent to sex with someone under 16 years of age, but may
not consent to sex with someone older than 16. While there are some minors
whom the law assumes are simply incompetent to consent to sex, minors over a
certain age are competent in many states to consent to sex, as long as the partner is not considerably older than the minor. 102 The consent obtained in these
cases is considered inherently coerced because “[a]lthough exploitation and coercion can occur in any sexual encounter involving a minor, the most obviously
exploitative situations involve a large age difference or a position of trust between the minor and the other participant.” 103 In these situations, the older participant “is often viewed as a predator who specifically sought out an underage
partner because of the power disparity.” 104 The rationale undergirding the invalidation of consent in these cases is that “when an adult engages in sexual activity with a minor, we assume that the minor’s decision to engage in that activity was the result of pressure, if not coercion, by the adult.” 105
Modern rape statutes protect the non-coercive dimension of autonomy
considerably more than common law-based rape statutes. At common law, coercion would negate consent only if it was the product of considerable physical
force. 106 As a result, non-physical threats would not give rise to rape liability at
common law. In one case, a high school principal told a student that she would
not be allowed to graduate unless she performed oral sex on him.107 The student
yielded to the threat and had oral sex with the principal. The court held that the
principal’s conduct was not criminal because only physical threats may give rise
to liability at common law. 108 Under more modern rape statutes, however, these
kinds of threats are considered inherently coercive and thus give rise to liability
for sexual assault. 109
In contrast, consent to a taking of property is typically valid under the law
of theft even when it takes place in the context of situations that the modern law
of rape describes as inherently coercive. As a result, contemporary law protects
the non-coercive dimension of autonomy more in the context of rape than in
the context of theft. It is useful to illustrate this concept with several examples.
A mental health therapist may lawfully sell goods to his patients. A student may

102.

Id.

103.

Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of
Substantive Law, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5, 18 (2013).

104. Id.
105.

Id.

106. See, e.g., Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (1872).
107.

State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Spreadbury, 257 P.3d 392 (Mont. 2011).

108. Id.
109. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 16-6-5.1 (2017) (criminalizing sex between teachers and students in Georgia).
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lawfully allow a teacher to borrow her vehicle. A fifteen-year-old can lawfully
give personal property as a gift to her twenty-one-year-old boyfriend. The
property exchanges in all of these cases are treated as consensual under the law
of theft in circumstances in which sex between the same parties would be considered nonconsensual. This shows that the kind of consent required by modern rape laws is more robust along the non-coercive dimension than the type of
consent that undergirds the law of theft.
Yet, consent in theft law is more robust than consent in rape law along the
informational dimension. While neither consent to sex in rape statutes nor consent to takings of property in theft laws typically require that certain disclosures
be made prior to the act in order for consent to be efficacious, theft law generally criminalizes obtaining property by fraud whereas sexual assault law does not
often prohibit sex obtained by deception. More specifically, the law of theft
broadly criminalizes lying in order to obtain property, 110 whereas the law of rape
only punishes sex obtained by lying in certain cases, such as when the defendant
impersonates the victim’s spouse or when the deception prevents the victim
from understanding the nature of the act. 111
I.

Autonomy and Consent: Summary

So far, I have demonstrated that autonomy and consent are both scalar and
multidimensional. I also distinguished between freedom and autonomy. Freedom is defined primarily by reference to the non-coercive dimension of autonomy. A choice is free when it is not coerced by internal or external forces. In
contrast, autonomy requires not only freedom from coercion, but also a certain
degree of competency and a given amount of information. In what follows, I
will explain how the distinction between freedom and autonomy and an understanding of the multidimensional and scalar nature of autonomy and consent
allow us to better grasp the fundamental commitments of modern rape reformers (Part II) and to find a way out of Rubenfeld’s riddle of rape-by-deception
(Part III).
II. Consent and Autonomy in Modern Rape Reform
Equipped with a better understanding of the scalar and multidimensional
nature of consent and autonomy, I will now survey the scholarly literature on
rape to identify the conceptions of consent and autonomy that undergird modern attempts to reform rape law. The analysis will show that the feminist rape
reform movement was primarily about securing additional freedom from coercion in the context of sexual relations. It will also reveal that the conceptions of
consent and autonomy that emerge from the modern rape reform movement
110.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

111.

For a more extensive discussion of the cases in which sex by deception is, or
should be, punished by rape law, see infra Section IV.D.
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are ones that considerably strengthen the non-coercive dimension of consent
and autonomy while leaving the competency and informational dimensions
largely untouched. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that contemporary
rape statutes do not broadly criminalize sex obtained by deception.
A. Rape as Individualized and Institutionalized Coercion
Sustained scholarly attention to rape in the literature began with the writings of many second-wave feminists of the 1970s. 112 The main thrust of these
writings was to conceive of rape as a crime of violence rather than a crime of
passion or desire. The view is said to originate with Susan Brownmiller’s assertion that “rape is a crime not of lust, but of violence and power.” 113 Similarly,
Susan Rae Peterson stated: “rape is first and foremost a crime of violence
against the body.” 114 According to this view, “rape has nothing to do with sexual
passion; it is an act of power, anger, or hatred.” 115 Rape thus becomes “an assaultive crime that attacks the physical integrity and mind of the victim.” 116
These scholars also viewed rape as a tool used by males to exercise power over
women in order to coerce them into behaving in ways that males found desirable.
Another important strand in this literature was the view that rape benefits
not only the actual rapist, but also all males. 117 All men benefit from rape because the crime is part of “a conscious process of intimidation by which all men
keep all women in a state of fear.” 118 Accordingly, Carolyn Shafer and Marilyn
Frye observe that “[w]omen in this society live generally under the threat of
112.

MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA: FEMINISM AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT 48–60 (2000).

113.

SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15 (1986).

114.

Susan Rae Peterson, Coercion and Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket, in
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 360, 364 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et al. eds., 1977).

115.

Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 156 (1992).

116.

Id.

117.

I acknowledge that many modern rape statutes do not limit rape liability to male
on female assault, but rather criminalize sexual assault regardless of gender. Nevertheless, the evolution of rape law has been strongly influenced by gendered factors and relationships. See, e.g., SUSAN J. BRISON, AFTERMATH: VIOLENCE AND THE
REMAKING OF A SELF 98 (2002) (describing rape as “gender-motivated violence
against women, which is perpetrated against women collectively, albeit not all at
once and in the same place”). Given that this Part aims to elucidate the fundamental philosophical commitments that undergirded the feminist rape reform movement and that this movement has, in fact, focused on such gendered factors and
relationships, the discussion proceeds based on that assumption. The aim of this
Part is thus to describe the views that inspired the modern rape reform movement
rather than to normatively justify them.

118.

BROWNMILLER, supra note 113, at 15.
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rape.” 119 This threat “limits the movements of women about their communities,
restricts their access to various services and amusements,” and “restricts their
pursuit both of comfort and of self-expression in their clothes and personal
styles.” 120 Men take advantage of this fear by offering women protection from
the threat of rape in exchange for sex and other benefits, such as love, monogamy, and motherhood. As one feminist scholar puts it, “the practice of rape effectively keeps women in their places; indeed, because many women fear being
raped, they remain much more stationary and sedentary than men.” 121
Rape is thus seen not only as an individualized crime that wrongs a specific
victim, but also as a broader societal practice that our patriarchal society uses to
coerce women into behaving in ways that males find appropriate. 122 The conception that emerges is that of rape as something that is “not primarily [understood] as a specific, singular crime, but rather as the most blatant example of
systematic misogyny and masculine dominance.” 123
The concept of consent that results from the view of rape as a crime of
domination and subjugation is one that is directly tied to the presence or absence of violence or coercion. Rape is nonconsensual, violent, and coerced sex.
Sex that is not rape is consensual, non-violent, and uncoerced. Thus, rape is defined as a case in which a “woman does not consent [to sex], or consents by coercion.” 124 Given the view of these scholars that rape is primarily a crime of violence, it is not surprising that the chief concern that underpins this literature is
that of coercion. Because of its violence, frequency, and threat of victimization,
rape generates a considerable amount of inherent social coercion that results in
significant curtailment of female liberty. 125 Hence, the “rape as violence” view
suggests that “what is wrong with rape is primarily its restriction of the freedom
of bodily movement for women.” 126
The feminist scholars who advocate this approach adopt a broad definition
of coercion and, therefore, of violence. While physical force and threats are coercive, so too are non-physical pressures that generate an inherently coercive
environment in which any consent obtained is suspect. Much like sex obtained
by physical force, sex obtained by the use of non-physical types of coercion is
incompatible with consent and, therefore, amounts to rape. According to one
respected scholar’s view:
119.

Carolyn M. Shafer & Marilyn Frye, Rape and Respect, in FEMINISM
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 114, at 333, 342.

120.

Id. at 342–43.

121.

Peterson, supra note 114, at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted).

122.

Id. at 364.

123.

ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 15 (2001).

124.

Peterson, supra note 114, at 366.

125.

Id.

126.

Id. at 360.
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The women’s folklore of rape—cases that seldom, if ever, reach a court
of law—is an oral history of abuses by men in positions of authority.
The therapist who applies his personal kind of sexual theory, the doctor
or dentist who suddenly turns a routine examination into a physical
overture that the bewildered patient feels helpless to halt, the producer
who preys on a starlet’s ambition, the professor who twists to his advantage his student’s interest in his field of scholarship—these are examples of what men would call seduction since the sexual goal may be
accomplished without the use, or even the threat, of physical force, but
the imposition of sex by an authority figure is hardly consensual or
“equal.” 127
There are two features of this view that I wish to highlight for the purposes
of this Article. First, the feminist scholars who advance the view of rape as violence are primarily interested in showing that (1) rape is coercive and violent at
an individual and institutional level, and (2) that the coercion is exercised by
males upon females directly and indirectly, overtly and subtly, and physically
and non-physically. This view of coercion is considerably broader than the view
of coercion that is presupposed by the common law of rape. The common law
of rape required that the perpetrator use or threaten to use physical force and
that the victim physically resist. 128 In contrast, the feminists who argued that
rape was violence adopted a considerably more robust definition of coercion
that did not require physical threats or resistance. Pursuant to this account of
rape, coercion “can take many forms,” including “economic and emotional coercion.” 129
Second, these scholars focused the vast majority of their energy on critically
assessing the non-coercive dimension of consent. That is, their project was primarily geared towards analyzing the kinds of overt and subtle forms of coercion
that rendered sex nonconsensual. More broadly, this feminist literature conceived of rape as a crime against women’s freedom of movement. Because of the
incessant fear of being raped, women do not feel free to do as they please and
are therefore indirectly coerced to turn to men for protection and to abide by
male-dominated rules regarding expected sexual behavior. Thus, these scholars
were primarily concerned with freedom rather than autonomy.
As I explained in Part I, although many people use the terms “freedom”
and “autonomy” interchangeably, philosophers often distinguish between the
two. 130 A common way of doing so is by defining freedom as the absence of external constraints, while defining autonomy as the capacity to critically accept

127.

BROWNMILLER, supra note 113, at 271.

128.

See, e.g., Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev’d, 424 A.2d 720
(Md. 1981).

129.

BROWNMILLER, supra note 113, at 271.

130.

See supra Section I.D.
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or revise the values, desires, and beliefs that ground the choices we make. 131 So
defined, freedom is primarily about the non-coercive dimension of autonomy
and consent. To be free in this sense is to be unconstrained by coercion and
other kinds of pressures. Freedom, then, is not about having sufficient information to make an informed choice. Instead, it is about not being physically or
psychologically pressured by others into doing what you do not desire to do.
This is precisely the kind of consent that lies at the core of the rape as violence
literature. This is not to say that these scholars did not address the informational dimension of consent or that they did not care about the broader notion of
autonomy; they were surely concerned about cases of uninformed or misinformed sex and frowned upon the use of deception to obtain sexual intercourse.
Nevertheless, this was not their primary focus. This feminist movement was
about domination, subjugation, and violence against women. As such, it focused primarily on coercion rather than on information and deception.
B. The Elusiveness of Consensual Sex in a Patriarchal Society
The rape-as-violence view distinguished between sex that was rape and sex
that was not rape and, consequently, between sex without consent (rape) and
consensual sex (non-rape). In contrast, a more radical feminist view argued that
the distinction between sex that is violent and non-violent or consensual or
nonconsensual is too elusive to ground a robust feminist theory of rape. These
more radical scholars argued that it is difficult to distinguish between rape and
non-rape in a male-dominated society. To be clear, these scholars did not argue
that all sex is rape, as many have incorrectly suggested. 132 They argue instead
that the boundaries between (bad) rape and (good) sex are so blurred in our
patriarchal society that it is hard to make sense of the distinction. Thus, these
scholars are skeptical of theories that presuppose that “rape is definable as distinct from intercourse,” given that rape and intercourse are difficult for women
“to distinguish . . . under conditions of male dominance.” 133
In criticizing the rape-as-violence literature, Professor Catharine MacKinnon states that although the approach “gave needed emphasis to rape’s previously effaced elements of power and dominance, it obscured its elements of
131.

Id.

132.

The claim that Professor Catharine MacKinnon asserted that “all sex is rape” can
be traced back to DAPHNE PATAI & NORETTA KOERTGE, PROFESSING FEMINISM:
CAUTIONARY TALES FROM INSIDE THE STRANGE WORLD OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 129
(1994) (claiming that “Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon have long argued that in a patriarchal society all heterosexual intercourse is rape”). For documentation on the origins of this mistaken claim, see Cindy Richards, Fighting a Lie
that Just Won’t Die, CHI. TRIB. (May 30, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
1999-05-30/news/9906030177_1_sexual-harassment-databases-journalism-ethics
[http://perma.cc/Z2K6-LN79].

133.

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983).
433

SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

35 : 407

2017

sex.” 134 Relatedly, MacKinnon rejects the rape-as-violence view because “to say
rape is violence not sex preserves the ‘sex is good’ norm by simply distinguishing forced sex as ‘not sex.’” 135 This has the effect of perpetuating patriarchal
norms regarding appropriate sexual behavior because it allows males to claim
that non-violent and consensual sex is acceptable when such distinctions are
notoriously difficult to make in a patriarchal society that defines men as dominant and females as passive.
According to this more radical view, male use of force to obtain sex is “romanticized” and “naturalized.” 136 There is a sense, then, in which force is sex
and sex is force under conditions of male dominance. 137 The force that accompanies sex in a patriarchal society ranges from subtle pressures such as “gender
socialization” and the “withholding of benefits” to harsher pressures such as
physical force. 138 Accordingly, sexuality in contemporary society amounts to “a
social sphere of male power to which forced sex is paradigmatic.” 139 This, in
turn, generates a view in which “coercion [is] integral to male sexuality.” 140
What is wrong, then, with sex in a male-dominated society is that it takes place
under inherently coercive circumstances. This makes it difficult to distinguish
between coerced sex that is traditionally viewed as rape and uncoerced sex that
is typically believed to be acceptable. MacKinnon then argues that the distinction between rape and sex is so blurred, that instead of asking “what is the violation of rape?” one should instead ask “what is the nonviolation of intercourse?” 141 When the social conditions under which the sex is obtained are
imbued with coercion, the distinction between forcible intercourse that
amounts to rape and non-forcible sex breaks down.
Since this more radical view assumes that sex is inherently coercive, it is not
surprising that consent plays little role in distinguishing unacceptable rape from
acceptable intercourse. If the problem with sex in a male-dominated society is
that it is inherently coercive, then consenting to sex does not solve the problem,
for consent takes place under the same inherently coercive circumstances. As
such, distinguishing between truly consensual acts and nonconsensual acts in a
patriarchal social order is as elusive as distinguishing between (bad) rape and
(good) sex.

134.

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: “Pleasure Under
Patriarchy,” 99 ETHICS 314, 323 (1989).
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Under this view, rape is “an act of subordination of women to men” that
“expresses and reinforces women’s inequality to men” rather than nonconsensual sex that violates a woman’s autonomy.142 Therefore, instead of asking
whether sex was consensual, one ought to ask “whether consent is a meaningful
concept.” 143 It seems clear to these radical scholars that it is not. Given that consent is insufficient to neutralize coercion in a male-dominated society, these
scholars argue in favor of abandoning the notion of consent. They claim that
the law needs to move beyond consent in order to neutralize this inherent coercion. As a result, several feminist scholars have attempted to come up with an
alternative concept that better distinguishes between appropriate and inappropriate sexual relations. For these scholars—as for those discussed in the previous section—the chief problem that rape law needed to address was the inherent coercion of sex in a male-dominated society. As such, these scholars were
more concerned with neutralizing inherent power imbalances than with securing autonomous consent.
One prominent approach to developing such an alternative conceptualization is that put forth by Lois Pineau in her influential article Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis. 144 She suggests that appropriate sexual intercourse is “communicative” rather than consensual. 145 The kind of communicative sexuality that
Pineau references is one that is premised on the idea of “mutuality of desire.” 146
Sex anchored in mutuality takes place when “each person’s interest in continuing is contingent upon the other person wishing to do so too, and each person’s
interest is as much fueled by the other’s interest as it is by her own.” 147 By requiring that people communicate before having sex and that they seek to do only that which the other party communicates that she wants, Pineau seeks to
eradicate “manipulative, coercive, and exploitive behaviour.” 148 Under this
model, coercive sex is thus defined as “noncommunicative” rather than nonconsensual. 149
Another feminist account that purports to transcend consent as the vehicle
for distinguishing rape from permissible sex is Professor Lynne Henderson’s.
Henderson offers multiple frameworks through which we could interpret rape,
one of which is critical of the prevailing conception of consent: “‘consensual’ in
a thin sense of the word ‘consent’ that fails to take into account women’s subordinated status and assumes that women have equal power to act autono142.

Id. at 182.

143.

MacKinnon, supra note 133, at 650.

144.

Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217 (1989).
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mously in sexual relations.” 150 Consent—at least as traditionally construed both
in law and society—“protect[s] an irrational and irresponsible model of male
sexuality, courting behavior, and female sexuality, giving women little access to
law in protecting themselves against male sexual aggression.” 151 In particular,
Henderson points out that current approaches to rape often lead to cases in
which consent can easily be obtained even when there is violence. 152 Given this
state of affairs, she proposes that we move to a model based on taking responsibility for and communicating about our sexuality. 153 This approach seeks to ensure that both man and woman are “interested” and “willing” to have sex and
“communicating” with each other about what they want and do not want to
do. 154 The goal is to encourage “[e]xploration of each other’s pleasure and desire in a context of empathy, communication, and care.” 155
Professor Martha Chamallas advanced another influential model of rape
that was not primarily based on consent. Her goal was to develop an “approach
to regulation designed to limit sexual coercion in amorous relationships, without eliminating sexual freedom.” 156 To do so, Chamallas develops an “egalitarian” view of sexuality that—like Pineau’s—is closely linked to the idea of mutuality. Borrowing heavily from sexual harassment doctrine, her model asks
“whether the more passive target of sexual overtures actually welcomed the initiative.” 157 In order to decide if the sexual initiative was welcome, we try to determine “whether the target would have initiated the encounter if she had been
given the choice.” 158 If we answer affirmatively, “there is some assurance of mutuality in the sexual encounter” and, therefore, there are good reasons for labeling the resulting sexual act as lawful. 159 If, however, we answer negatively, then
we ought to be skeptical of mutuality and, consequently, have reason to consider the resulting sexual act to be unlawful. 160 This egalitarian view is geared towards maximizing choices made in circumstances of relative equality between
the parties. If the male has more power than the female, then the choice to engage in sexual intercourse is suspect, even if no obvious force or coercion was
150.
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used to obtain sex. Chamallas thus concludes that the most egalitarian and mutual kind of sex is that which seeks intimacy or pleasure. On the contrary, “sexual encounters in which money, power, prestige, or financial or physical security is traded for sexual pleasure or intimacy” are at odds with the egalitarian
model. 161 While it is true that in these encounters “each party might be said to
have gained something,” they fail to comport to the egalitarian ideal since “they
are not premised on mutuality because the gains of each are so different in
character.” 162
While there are subtle variations amongst the proposals put forth by
Pineau, Henderson, and Chamallas, they share two features. First, they all take
as their point of departure that consent is not the best way to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate sexual intercourse. Second, all of these
models are primarily designed to counteract the inherently coercive environment in which consent to sexual relations is typically obtained under conditions
of male dominance.
An example that demonstrates the failures of the traditional consent model
is date rape. Date rape occurs when a person is raped by someone she knows. 163
The perpetrator is typically someone the victim has dated or is otherwise romantically involved with. The challenge that date rape presents for current rape
law is that in many, if not most, date rape cases consent is not obtained by obvious use of coercion. In many instances the woman passively submits to a
man’s sexual advances after initially expressing reservations about having intercourse. 164 In other cases, the woman may verbally say “no” but the male claims
to have construed her non-verbal cues as indicating consent in spite of the verbal refusal. 165 The traditional consent model fails in many of these instances because courts often infer consent when a woman submits to a man’s repeated
sexual advances even if the woman initially hesitated. Similarly, courts often infer consent from non-verbal cues such as kissing and other acts of foreplay, and
they sometimes do so even when the woman verbally expresses that she does
not wish to have sexual intercourse.
From a feminist perspective, these cases are problematic not only because it
is unclear whether they are consensual or not, but also—and more importantly—because the sexual intercourse takes place under conditions of unequal
power that make it difficult for the woman to meaningfully consent to intercourse. The power imbalance between men and women creates inherently coercive circumstances in much the same way that inherently coercive circumstanc-
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es are created by the imbalance of power that exists between employers and
employees, doctors and patients, and ministers and parishioners. As a result, the
problem with consent, as Janet Halley recently pointed out, is that “much of the
sex women have with men is consented to under coercive circumstances—
subjectively consented to by women who nevertheless find the sex to be unwanted.” 166
In order to neutralize the coercion that is inherent in this power imbalance,
these scholars propose that males communicate with females about whether
they desire to have sex rather than merely inferring consent. As a result, much
like the literature previously discussed, the scholarship that advocates for alternatives to consent is primarily driven by a desire to neutralize coercion rather
than to make sure that sex takes place only when both parties are informed of
material facts.
It is once again illustrative to think about why date rape cases are of such
importance to this literature. The problem with date rape is not typically that
the parties do not have full information about what is about to take place. The
issue in these cases is inherent coercion, not lack of knowledge. More specifically, we worry that only token consent was obtained because it is difficult to fully
credit female consent to male sexual advances when existing social norms encourage male aggression and female passivity.
It is not that these scholars did not object to using deception to obtain sex.
They surely did. However, they did not identify this as the chief evil of sex obtained in conditions of male dominance. There is something more pernicious
and more fundamental about sex in a patriarchal society than its simply being
misinformed. A male-dominated social order does not need misinformation in
order to make women submit to sex. Given the coercion inherent in this kind of
social arrangement, women regularly give in to men’s aggressive sexual proposals even when they are informed of all relevant facts.
Therefore, the radical feminist movement regarding rape is best seen as one
that intended to maximize women’s freedom to engage in sexual intercourse.
Once again, the “freedom” that I have in mind is not one that is coextensive
with autonomy. Rather, it is freedom in the technical sense of “unconstrained
choice.” In the context of the radical feminist movement regarding rape, to be
free is to engage in sex without being coerced to do so, either by overt physical
force or by the subtler pressures that permeate sexual encounters that occur
under conditions of male dominance. Whether the sex is also fully informed is
tangential to this more general project.
C. Strengthening Consent: From Negative Consent to Affirmative Consent
While some rape law scholars advocated for the abandonment of consent,
others argued that the best way to reform rape doctrine was to adopt a more
robust standard of consent. These scholars argue that rape is wrong because it
infringes on sexual autonomy. Pursuant to this approach, autonomy is con166. Janet Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, 42 SIGNS 257, 265 (2016).
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ceived as an affirmative exercise of choice as opposed to merely a choice that is
not forced. According to Professor Stephen Schulhofer—the most well-known
advocate of the affirmative consent view of rape—the serious physical intrusion
that takes place during sexual intercourse demands that consent not “simply be
the absence of clearly crystallized, clearly expressed opposition.” 167 Instead,
“nothing less than positive willingness, clearly communicated . . . should ever
count as consent.” 168 Neither ambiguous conduct, passivity, nor silence can
count as consent to sex under this model. The approach is intended to “shift the
emphasis of the consent inquiry away from concern over whether the woman
explicitly communicated her opposition” to whether the man “has a clear indication of the other person’s consent.” 169 By requiring clear words or actions that
signal consent, we are “placing [the] onus on those who initiate sexual contact
to secure agreement.” 170
Schulhofer’s influential theory of affirmative consent is developed at length
in his book Unwanted Sex. Although the entire tome amounts to an elaboration
of his theory of sexual autonomy, Schulhofer devotes only seven pages to analyzing whether and how deception may impinge on sexual autonomy. 171 In contrast, he devotes close to two hundred pages to discussing coercion and power
in the context of sexual relations. Schulhofer is especially concerned about cases
in which “a woman confronts sexual pressure from a man who holds professional power over her,” 172 and he includes separate chapters discussing the pressures that are built into the superior/subordinate, doctor/patient, and lawyer/
client relationships. 173 Schulhofer is particularly worried about these cases because the traditional approach to rape law “offers no help in these situations because the tactics men use, though sometimes flagrantly coercive, are not physically violent.” 174 Of course, the traditional approach to rape law also offers little
help in situations in which sex is obtained by deception. Schulhofer acknowledges as much. Nevertheless, his autonomy-based view of rape has little implication for cases in which sex obtains as a result of material misrepresentations
of fact.
What this reveals is that Schulhofer’s project is focused almost in its entirety on enhancing the non-coercive dimension of consent. The informational di-

167.

STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE
FAILURE OF LAW 271 (1998).

168.

Id.

OF INTIMIDATION AND THE

169. Id.
170.

Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865, 872 (2008).

171.

SCHULHOFER, supra note 167, at 152–59.

172.

Id. at 5.

173.

Id. at 168–253.

174.

Id. at 5.
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mension of autonomy, on the other hand, remains largely unaffected by his
model. As a result, when Schulhofer talks about sexual autonomy, he is usually
referring to the non-coercive aspect of autonomy. That is, he is primarily interested in ensuring that sex is uncoerced. While Schulhofer would surely prefer
that sex also be informed, he clearly prioritizes freedom from coercion over
freedom from misrepresentation. Schulhofer’s project—much like the projects
of most modern rape reformers—is thus better understood as one that seeks to
maximize sexual freedom as opposed to sexual autonomy.
D. Modern Rape Reform: Sexual Freedom, Not Sexual Autonomy
The standard story about the evolution of rape law begins with rape as a
crime against the property interests of men and typically culminates with a
more enlightened, less sexist conception of rape as a crime against sexual autonomy. 175 In terms of the defining elements of the offense, rape has slowly
evolved from a crime of violence that required the perpetrator to use, or threaten to use, physical force to an offense against freedom of choice that is consummated when the perpetrator engages in sexual intercourse without consent. 176
Of course, given that substantive criminal law is generally up to the states,
the current state of rape in America varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some states continue to require that the defendant use physical force. 177
These states do not typically criminalize sex that is obtained by using nonphysical forms of coercion or intercourse that takes place in the context of an
inherently coercive relationship. 178 Many jurisdictions also continue to require
that the victim resist the defendant’s use of force. 179 Other states adopt the affirmative consent model of rape that views the offense as a violation of sexual
autonomy. 180 States that come closer to adopting an autonomy-based model of
sexual assault expressly criminalize sex obtained by the use of non-physical coercion, sometimes going as far as criminalizing any sex that takes place in inher-

175.

For an overview of the history of rape and rape reform, see Timothy W. Murphy,
A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19, 19–21 (1996).

176.

GUYORA BINDER, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CRIMINAL LAW 239–43
(2016).

177.

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2907.02(A)(2) (2017) (punishing rape when a person
“compels the other person to submit [to sex] by force or threat of force”); see also
Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. 2007).

178.

Id.

179.

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 14:42.1 (2017) (defining rape as a case “[w]hen the victim
is prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of physical violence”); see
also State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219 (Idaho 2013).

180. See, e.g., State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
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ently coercive relationships, regardless of whether the sex was nominally consensual. 181
While many states continue to require force, the trend in recent years is towards dropping the force requirement and instead criminalizing nonconsensual
intercourse. The trend is inspired in great part by feminist critiques of traditional rape law and by the sexual autonomy model put forth by scholars like
Schulhofer. As a result, it has become commonplace for courts and commentators to claim that the chief goal of modern rape reform is to protect sexual autonomy. 182 While this claim seems plausible at first glance, it turns out to be
misleading in several ways, some of which have allowed scholars like Rubenfeld
to mistakenly claim that rape-by-deception presents an irresolvable riddle for
modern rape reformers.
It is true that many contemporary rape reformers argue that rape is a crime
against sexual autonomy. It is also true that modern rape statutes protect sexual
autonomy more than traditional common law rape laws. However, as my brief
recount of feminist and liberal rape literature reveals, modern rape reform has
disproportionately focused on one dimension of autonomy, leaving the other
two dimensions mostly intact. Although there are considerable differences
amongst the different groups that have advocated for rape law reform during
the last several decades, they all focused primarily on devising ways of enhancing the non-coercive dimension of autonomy.
This is the best way of making sense of why modern rape reformers targeted some features of traditional rape law doctrine and not others. Contemporary
critiques of traditional rape law unanimously called for the abolition of both the
defendant force and victim resistance requirements, 183 while also calling for the
criminalization of non-physical forms of coercion. 184 However, most did not
call for broad criminalization of uninformed or misinformed sex. 185 To be sure,
some scholars argued in favor of broadly criminalizing sex obtained by fraud. 186
Nevertheless, no rape law scholar has ever argued in favor of imposing a duty to
inform prospective sex partners of all material facts related to intercourse, and
only a handful of scholars have suggested that all material misrepresentations

181.

See, e.g., GA. CODE § 16-6-5.1 (2017); see also State v. Baptista, 894 A.2d 911 (R.I.
2006).

182.

For judicial references describing rape as a crime against autonomy, see State in the
Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277–78. For an autonomy-centered approach to
rape in the scholarly literature, see generally Schulhofer, supra note 16.

183.

See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 45–46.

184.

Id. at 92–93.

185.

See, e.g., Falk, supra note 37 (arguing for selective criminalization of rape by fraud).

186.

See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1120 (1986).
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that result in sex ought to be punished. 187 Others, like Feinberg 188 and Schulhofer, 189 have argued that sex obtained by fraud should be criminalized when the
deception is coercive but generally not criminalized when it is not coercive.
The approach to rape law that emerges from this literature is one that primarily seeks to neutralize coercion rather than deception. While sex obtained
by deception is certainly viewed by these scholars as pernicious, the problems
raised by most cases of sex by deception pale in comparison with those raised by
sex obtained by coercion. Given that the primary concern of contemporary rape
scholars was neutralizing the coercion inherent in sexual relations that take
place under conditions of male dominance, modern rape statutes are best understood as seeking to advance sexual freedom, not sexual autonomy.
III. Solving the Riddle of Rape-by-Deception
Professor Jed Rubenfeld argued in a recent influential article that modern
rape reform generates a “riddle of rape-by-deception.” 190 The riddle is that if
rape is primarily an offense against sexual autonomy—as most modern approaches to sexual assault claim it is—then the law should prohibit sex by deception just as much as it prohibits sex by force. After all, deception—like
force—negates autonomy in many contexts outside of rape doctrine, including
the laws of theft and contracts. Yet, contemporary rape statutes do not generally
criminalize sex obtained by deception. So either rape statutes are guilty of a
profound, inexplicable oversight, or rape law is not really about sexual autonomy. Rubenfeld argues for the latter, claiming that rape law is really about the
right to self-possession rather than about autonomy. 191
Rubenfeld’s account of rape law fails to grasp that autonomy and consent
are multidimensional and scalar concepts that allow for the recognition of more
and less robust conceptions of consent and autonomy across several distinct but
interconnected dimensions. As I argued in Part I, autonomy is scalar in the
sense that it can exist along a spectrum ranging from minimal to maximal autonomy. It is multidimensional because (lack of) coercion, competency, and information are all important components of autonomy.
Rubenfeld’s failure to account for the scalar and multidimensional nature
of consent and autonomy prevents him from appreciating that we can selectively criminalize rape-by-deception without calling into question the kind of sexual autonomy (and consent) that lies at the core of rape offenses. More specifi187.

Id. Estrich argues that material deception to obtain sex should be punished as sexual assault in much the same way as material deception to obtain property is punished as theft.

188.

Joel Feinberg, Victims’ Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent, 96
ETHICS 330, 337 (1986).

189.

Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 93.

190. Rubenfeld, supra note 12.
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cally, he fails to appreciate that rape offenses principally seek to safeguard the
non-coercive dimension of autonomy. 192 Since modern rape laws are primarily
about preventing coercion in sexual encounters, rather than deception, there is
nothing perplexing about rape laws that only selectively criminalize deception.
This is not to say, however, that modern rape laws are wholly indifferent to
deception. While courts and scholars certainly do not require full disclosure of
all material facts before valid consent to sex can obtain, they sometimes require
disclosure of certain material facts (e.g., whether a person is HIV positive) 193
and often prohibit deception regarding certain other material facts (e.g., facts
pertaining to the identity of the parties or to the nature of the act). 194
Reasonable people will surely disagree about how stringently courts ought
to police the informational dimension of consent in the sexual context. However, this disagreement is not about whether we actually care about sexual autonomy in these cases, as Rubenfeld appears to suggest. Rather, the disagreement is
about the degree and kind of autonomy that should be recognized as legally relevant in this context. Acknowledging that a certain degree of autonomy is
enough to generate legally valid consent, even when more autonomy could be
required, simply specifies the kind of autonomy that is relevant in these contexts rather than undermining the very notion of sexual autonomy. As courts
and legislatures continue to rethink the boundaries of consent and sexual autonomy in cases of rape-by-deception, the degree of autonomy that is deemed
necessary for legally valid consent to sex to obtain will surely shift. But the
change will occur within the domain of autonomy rather than outside of it.
Recognition of more (or less) autonomy presupposes that some degree of autonomy is already present. As a result, the failure of courts and modern rape reform statutes to criminalize all sex obtained as a consequence of material deception does not show that rape law is primarily about something other than sexual
autonomy. Instead, it reveals that autonomy is a scalar notion that may be coherently protected more or less depending on the way in which the balance is
struck between the competing interests at stake in any given situation.

192.

The claim that rape laws are primarily about the non-coercive dimension of (sexual) autonomy is essentially identical to the claim that rape laws are primarily about
(sexual) freedom, given that “freedom” is defined as the absence of coercion. It is
important to note that the concepts of “freedom” and “autonomy” are not in tension with each other. “Freedom” is simply another way of referring to the “noncoercive” dimension of autonomy.

193.

See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 5-14-123 (2017) (making it a crime to have sex without first
informing the other person of the presence of HIV). For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see infra Section IV.B.

194.

See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(d)(4) (2017), as recognized in People v.
Robinson, 370 P.3d 1043 (Cal. 2016) (reviewing the scholarly literature on sex by
deception). For more discussion of the selective way in which current rape law
criminalizes rape-by-deception, see infra Section IV.C.
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A. The Misleading Analogy Between Consent in Theft and Rape Law
Rubenfeld argues that rape law does not really protect autonomy because it
fails to criminalize sex by deception as broadly as theft law criminalizes obtaining property by deception. 195 If consent is not typically invalidated by deception
in the context of rape law, then it must be because consent is not really essential
at all. Once again, Rubenfeld’s reasoning is flawed because he fails to appreciate
the scalarity and multidimensionality of consent.
By focusing solely on the informational dimension of consent, Rubenfeld
ignores the fact that consent in sexual assault law is sometimes more robust
than consent in theft law and that—as a result—it is not really the case that
consent in rape law is weaker than consent in theft law. An interdimensional
analysis of consent and autonomy in the context of rape and theft doctrine reveals that both areas of law protect a comparable degree of autonomy, but that
they do so along different dimensions. Theft law emphasizes the informational
dimensions of consent and autonomy, whereas rape law focuses more on the
non-coercive dimension. Furthermore—and perhaps more importantly—
neither rape law nor theft law protects the informational dimension of autonomy as robustly as it is protected in other legal realms. Modern rape reform prohibits some instances of misinformed consent but not all. 196 It also does not
prohibit uninformed consent, given that it does not generally require that parties disclose material facts prior to having sex. 197 In contrast, modern theft law
broadly prohibits affirmative misrepresentations that lead to misinformed consent. 198 However, like rape law, it does not generally prohibit uninformed consent that is the product of a failure to disclose material facts. Consent in medical
malpractice is more robust than consent in either rape or theft law—there is an
affirmative duty to disclose material facts to patients prior to obtaining their
consent to treatment.
Unfortunately, Rubenfeld glosses over these important distinctions because he approaches consent and autonomy as all-or-nothing concepts. Where
Rubenfeld sees deception he cannot see consent, and where he sees autonomy
he cannot see misrepresentation. But since consent and autonomy are matters
of degree, they are consistent with certain amounts and kinds of deception. The
amount of deception that is compatible with the kind of consent and autonomy
that we demand in a particular context will depend on the circumstances. We
will tolerate more deception in some situations and less in others, depending on
many factors, including the harms that will ensue if deception takes place and
195.

Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1407.

196. For a more detailed discussion of the classic instances of deception prohibited by
modern rape law, see infra Section IV.C.
197.

However, statutes often impose some criminal liability for a person who fails to
disclose that he is infected with a dangerous STD prior to having sex. See infra Section IV.B.

198.
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whether there is considerable asymmetry of information between the parties. As
the magnitude and likelihood of harm from misinformation increases, the case
for broadly prohibiting deception gets stronger. By the same token, the more
that a certain interaction is plagued by information asymmetry, the stronger the
case for broadening the prohibition on deception. Since the need for prohibiting deception varies widely from situation to situation, we will draw the line between permissible and impermissible deception differently depending on context. But the fact that different lines will need to be drawn does not mean that
consent and autonomy cease to be meaningful concepts. Sometimes the line
drawn in one context will enhance informational autonomy compared to another context. On other occasions it will not.
Relatedly, Rubenfeld is mistaken to claim that rape law must match the
lines drawn by the law of theft regarding permissible and impermissible deception because his comparison point is arbitrary. Why should rape law not match
the lines drawn by medical malpractice law regarding deception? For that matter, why should theft law not protect autonomy as much as it is protected in the
context of medical treatment? Once we acknowledge that consent can be valid
even if informational autonomy is not fully secured, then we are merely haggling about price. Rubenfeld claims that a rape law committed to sexual autonomy should draw the same lines that theft law does regarding deception. 199 But I
can pick another legal doctrine as a point of reference and argue that the line
should be placed elsewhere both for rape law and for theft doctrine. If I take the
Fourth Amendment doctrine of consent to police searches as my baseline, then
rape law protects informational autonomy more than adequately. If instead I
choose medical malpractice as my baseline, it does not. Surely whether informational autonomy in particular and autonomy in general are sufficiently protected by rape law should not depend on what legal doctrine I take as my baseline. Instead, it should depend on whether the circumstances that typically
surround the kind of interaction at issue demand robust protection of informational autonomy or not. For modern rape reformers, the chief threat to sexual
autonomy comes from coercion, not deception. If this is the case, there is nothing mysterious about the fact that modern rape statutes do not protect the informational dimension of autonomy as much as the non-coercive dimension.
B. Rape-by-Deception and the Materiality Problem
Rubenfeld argues that a view of rape that takes consent seriously must
acknowledge that “material” deception negates consent to sex. 200 He then argues that modern rape law does not respect autonomy because it fails to prohibit material deception as broadly as it is prohibited pursuant to contract law
or theft law. This argument is flawed because it mistakenly assumes that standards of materiality hold constant across different areas of law.
199.

Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1407.
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To understand why this assumption is mistaken, it is useful to compare the
meaning of material deception in the law of medical malpractice with the
meaning of material deception in the context of theft by false pretenses. In the
medical malpractice context, a failure to disclose important facts related to a
given medical treatment is typically considered “material” deception. 201 It is
material in the non-legal sense because it makes a difference to the patient’s decision-making process. It also satisfies the legal threshold for materiality that
courts have crafted in the medical malpractice context. In contrast, a failure to
disclose important facts related to a property exchange is generally not considered “material” deception under the law of theft by false pretenses.202 While
more kinds of deception count as material under the law of medical malpractice
than under the law of theft by false pretenses, it would be erroneous to infer
from this that there is something wrong with the standard of materiality in the
theft by deception context or that the law of theft is not really concerned with
consent or autonomy.
Rubenfeld makes the same mistake when he argues that if deception is material enough to negate consent in the context of theft, it ought to be enough to
negate consent in the context of rape. While he is correct that more kinds of deception count as material under the law of theft than under the law of rape, this
does not mean that the standard of materiality in the law of rape is wrong or
that consent is not taken seriously by the law of rape.
Ultimately, what counts as material in a certain context depends on a multiplicity of competing factors. Sometimes the balance of these factors suggests
that we ought to set the bar for materiality quite low, as in the case of medical
malpractice. On other occasions, analysis of the competing factors counsels in
favor of setting a higher standard of materiality. Whether such decisions are
correct does not depend on some fixed materiality measure, as Rubenfeld’s
analysis presupposes. Rather, it depends on whether there are good reasons for
setting the materiality bar higher or lower in any given context. In the particular
context of rape, I believe there are good reasons for setting the materiality bar
quite high when it comes to deception. I take up an analysis of these reasons in
the next two sections.
C. The Nature of Modern Rape Reform, the Purposes of Rape Law, and the
Problem of Rape-by-Deception
I have argued that a plausible case can be made for a conception of consent
in the context of rape law that is quite robust along the non-coercive dimension
and considerably less so along the informational dimension. According to this

201.

See, e.g., Martin by Scoptur v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Wis. 1995).

202. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 19.7(b)(3) (2d ed. 2003)(“A
misrepresentation for false pretenses generally requires some affirmative conduct.”).
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view, consent to sex must be significantly uncoerced but it can be somewhat
uninformed.
To his credit, Rubenfeld discusses the plausibility of this approach. Since “a
coercion-based rape law would still exclude most cases of sexual deception” because “deception is not coercion,” 203 Rubenfeld acknowledges that the result
would be “a happy medium between a rape law so narrow that it prohibits only
sex induced by physical force and a rape law so broad that it jails people who
have sex while concealing their true age, looks, income, or degree of romantic
interest.” 204 Thus, “[a] coercion requirement offers an appealing compromise
between the two extreme positions, reaching desired results while bringing rape
law a step closer to sexual autonomy.” 205
In spite of the admittedly attractive nature of this approach, Rubenfeld rejects it because “[t]he coercion requirement’s exclusion of rape-by-deception is
contradicted by its own internal logic.” 206 In order to demonstrate that viewing
rape as uncoerced sex is conceptually problematic, Rubenfeld relies on an analogy between coercion and deception: “[a]n anti-coercion principle is attractive
because coerced sex is unconsented-to sex.” 207 However, “if unconsented-to sex
is rape law’s target, then deceptive sex ought to be punished as well.” 208 Expressed syllogistically, the argument goes like this:
(1) All nonconsensual sex is punished as rape.
(2) Sex obtained by deception is nonconsensual.
(3) Therefore, sex obtained by deception should be punished as rape.
Rubenfeld’s argument falters because premise (2) is objectionable on both
conceptual and practical grounds. From a conceptual perspective, he once again
fails to consider that autonomy and consent have a non-coercive, and an informational dimension and that in some contexts lawmakers have decided to
prioritize protection of one dimension over the other. Furthermore, if we believe that the chief threat to the legitimacy of sexual interactions is coercion,
and not deception, then we may wish to draw the lines between sex and rape in
precisely the way that Rubenfeld objects to.
From a practical perspective, Rubenfeld’s argument against viewing rape as
uncoerced sex fails because he does not fully appreciate the real world concerns
that generated the modern rape reform movement. The turn from force to consent in modern rape reform was not the product of a sudden realization that
sexual autonomy mattered. Traditional rape law came under fire because it was
erected upon conceptions of male aggressiveness and female passivity that are
203. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1411.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1412.
207. Id.
208. Id. (emphasis omitted).
447

SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

35 : 407

2017

characteristic of a patriarchal society. 209 The requirements that the perpetrator
obtain sex by physical force and that the victim physically resist were objectionable because they perpetuated a male-centered view of appropriate sexual conduct, regardless of whether consent to sex was nominally obtained. Under conditions of male dominance, female consent to sex was viewed as inherently
suspect anyway. 210 In the language of coercion, we would say that sex in a maledominated society was viewed as problematic because it was inherently coercive
for women. It was this belief that heterosexual sex in a patriarchal social order
was inherently coercive that spurred modern rape reform, not an abstract concern for maximizing autonomy. 211
It is thus unsurprising that the reforms that ensued focused on outlawing
coerced sex rather than sex obtained by deception. To borrow from Justice
Holmes’ oft-cited phrase, the life of rape reform “has not been logic . . . [i]t has
been experience.” 212 Rape scholars focused on the non-coercive dimensions of
consent and autonomy because the female experience of sex in a maledominated society was characterized by aggression. Once placed in its proper
context, consent in rape law emerges as a tool to counteract male aggression in
both its physical and non-physical forms. Since modern rape reformers and
scholars were primarily concerned with addressing coercion, their frequent references to sexual autonomy as the centerpiece of modern approaches to rape
law should be understood against this backdrop.
This suggests that what contemporary rape reform scholars usually mean
when they argue that we should embrace a given change in rape law, because
doing so promotes the foundational right to sexual autonomy, is that the proposed change enhances the non-coercive dimension of autonomy. Since the informational dimension of autonomy is largely tangential to the central feminist
project of rethinking the coercive component of autonomy, most references to
autonomy in the rape reform literature are of limited usefulness in the rape by
fraud context. To be sure, the move from force to consent also served to enhance the more liberal, abstract, and gender neutral notion of (sexual) autonomy. But this was only a salutary side effect of the main project, which was to do
what could be done to counteract the aggressive view of sexuality imbued into
the fabric of a patriarchal social order. The strong commitment to enhanced
freedom in the coercive dimension that modern rape reform scholars display
does not necessarily commit them to advocating for an equally robust recognition of informational autonomy. Once the view of rape as uncoerced sex is
placed in its proper historical and social context, the tension that Rubenfeld
perceives between broadly criminalizing sex by coercion and only exceptionally
punishing sex by deception disappears.
209. See authorities discussed supra notes 132–41.
210.

See supra notes 142–43.

211.
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OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); see also Falk, supra note
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In more philosophical terms, defining rape as uncoerced sex is justified if
we view the modern rape reform movement as one that sought to maximize
sexual freedom or the non-coercive dimension of autonomy213 as opposed to
sexual autonomy itself. That is, as a movement that emphasized sexual choices
that were not constrained by external pressures as opposed to sexual choices
that were fully informed. I believe that this view of rape is more compatible
with both the theoretical commitments of rape reformers and the practical reality of rape. Regarding the conceptual underpinnings of rape reform, the common thread that holds modern rape literature together is the worry that—under
conditions of male dominance—female submission to sex is problematic even
when physical force is not used. The concern with better understanding and
counteracting the overt and subtle forms of coercion that shape sexual interactions in a patriarchal society is perfectly compatible with an approach to rape
that primarily defines the crime as uncoerced sex. With regard to the practical
reality of rape, the general experience of rape that informs modern rape law reform is that of sex that occurs because men want it even when women do not
want it. Women submit to sex even when they do not want to because there are
obvious and not so obvious social pressures that consciously and unconsciously
constrain a woman’s decision to have sex. An approach to rape that defines the
crime as uncoerced sex is well-equipped to neutralize these pressures.
Once rape is viewed as a crime against sexual freedom, Rubenfeld’s argument against defining rape as sex without coercion loses its force. Since coercion impinges on freedom in ways that deception does not, there is no contradiction in broadly prohibiting coerced sex and only selectively punishing
deceptive sex.
An objection to this solution of the riddle is that the kind of freedom that is
protected by this view of rape is nugatory. But this is not so. While more freedom or autonomy could obviously be protected both along the non-coercive
and the informational dimensions, ensuring that sexual intercourse takes place
without undue pressures is not a trivial matter. This is especially the case given
the history of rape and rape reform. To the extent that the chief issue that rape
reformers sought to address was the inherent compulsion that permeates sexual
encounters under conditions of male dominance, a definition of rape that significantly broadens the kinds of coercion that give rise to liability is a logical
and welcome development.
D. Defending the View of Rape as Uncoerced Sex
So far, I have argued that defining rape as uncoerced sex is perfectly compatible with the goals that modern rape reforms sought to advance. But can a
definition of rape that mostly focuses on the non-coercive dimension of autonomy be defended on other grounds? Are there good reasons for viewing rape as

213.

It is once again worth clarifying that what I mean by (sexual) freedom is coextensive with the non-coercive dimension of (sexual) autonomy.
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a crime that seeks primarily to advance sexual freedom as opposed to sexual autonomy? I believe there are.
It could be argued that we ought to prioritize freedom over autonomy because freedom from coercion is more important than freedom from deception.
More specifically, it is plausible to argue that coercion is—all things being
equal—more wrongful than deception. This view is implicit in our legal system.
Coercion is generally regarded as criminal. Physical coercion is typically punished as assault or battery. Non-physical forms of coercion are often punished
as extortion or blackmail. 214 Coercion that results in sex is generally punished as
rape, while coercion that results in takings of property is typically punished as
theft or robbery. In contrast, deception is not generally regarded as criminal.
The most blameworthy kind of deception—lying 215—is only punishable in certain contexts, such as theft by false pretenses and perjury. The other two kinds
of deception—misleading 216 and passively deceiving 217—are generally not punished at all. If coercion is more wrongful than deception, then it is defensible to
impose criminal liability in most cases of coerced sex while not doing so in most
cases of sex by deception. While both coerced and deceived sex may be wrongful, it can be plausibly argued that coerced sex more often rises to the degree of
wrongfulness that should trigger the imposition of criminal liability than sex by
deception.
There are also good reasons to believe that coercion is more of a problem
than deception in the specific context of rape. This is especially the case when
we take into account the power imbalance that exists between males and females in a patriarchal society and how this power disparity creates inherently
coercive circumstances when it comes to sexual relations between men and
women. While heterosexual sex and coercion are intertwined in a patriarchal
society, conditions of male dominance do not generate any special connection
between sex and deception. Although some men surely use deception to obtain
sex, so do some women. An empirical study on the deceptive practices of men
and women in dating situations found that both men and women believe that
“women are more likely to lie about their physical attractiveness, while . . . men
are more likely to lie about their financial status, and their likelihood for com214.

Regarding extortion, see generally Scheidler v. National Organization for Women,
Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 407–08 (2003), which explains that “extortion necessarily involves the use of coercive conduct to obtain property.” Regarding blackmail, see
generally Miller v. Lewis, 381 F. Supp. 2d 773, 791 (N.D. Ill. 2005), stating that the
“gravamen” of blackmail “is the exercise of coercion or an improper influence.”

215.

Lying is asserting something that one knows is false. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING,
CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 78 (2006)
(defining lying verbal deception as “asserting what one believes is literally false”).

216.

Misleading is making an incomplete but true statement with the intent of leading
the listener to believe something that is false. Id.

217.

Passively deceiving is deliberately withholding material information. See, e.g., Larsry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 LAW & PHIL. 393,
414 (2003).
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mitment to a relationship.” 218 As a result, “both men and women . . . expect that
members of the opposite sex will lie” in the context of social and sexual interactions. 219 It is thus unclear whether deception in the sexual context is more of a
problem for women than for men. Since sex in a patriarchal society is inherently coercive but not inherently uninformed, the effects of patriarchal conceptions
of appropriate sexual conduct are considerably more problematic in the context
of coercion than in the informational context.
More importantly, it is not really necessary for men to use deception in order to obtain sex in a male-dominated society. Under social conditions that encourage male aggressiveness and female passivity, coercion is so infused into the
fabric of sexuality that there is little need for men to use deception in order to
obtain sex. Until we succeed in weeding coercion out of sexuality, there are contingent reasons for feminist rape reformers to care more about coercion than
about deception.
An additional rationale that may justify protecting the informational dimension of consent more in medical malpractice and theft cases is the informational asymmetry that often characterizes the typical doctor/patient relationship
and that is sometimes present in commercial property exchanges. In run-ofthe-mill cases, doctors know exponentially more than patients about the nature
and risks of medical treatment. In light of this asymmetry, disclosure rules that
level the disparity of information seem sensible. To a lesser extent, the same is
true regarding property exchanges. Given the nature of commercial transactions in modern times, it is common in some contexts for certain actors to consistently have more information than others. 220 There is no such asymmetry in
the context of sexual intercourse. When it comes to sex, there is no inherent
reason why one party will regularly have more information than the other. In
terms of information asymmetry, property exchanges seem to occupy an intermediate position between sexual interactions and doctor/patient relationships.
Property transactions are more often plagued with informational asymmetry
than sexual relations but less often than medical treatment decisions. This provides a plausible explanation of why theft law prohibits deception more broadly
than modern rape law but less broadly than medical malpractice law.

IV. Framing Principles for Criminalizing Rape-by-Deception
218.

Joseph J. Benz, Mary K. Anderson & Richard L. Miller, Attributions of Deception in
Dating Situations, 55 PSYCHOL. REC. 305, 312 (2005).

219.

Id. at 313.

220. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J.
2225, 2226 (1999) (“One of the most common problems in commercial transactions
is the resolution of information asymmetries, situations in which one party to the
transaction knows more about a relevant fact than the other party.”).
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So far I have argued that modern rape law is best understood as seeking to
protect sexual freedom as opposed to sexual autonomy itself. Expressed in
terms of the dimensions of autonomy, I have argued that to the extent that
modern rape law is concerned with autonomy, it is largely concerned with the
non-coercive aspect of autonomy. Sexual freedom is about choosing to engage
in sex without being pressured into doing so by external constraints. That is,
sexual freedom is about the non-coercive dimension of autonomy rather than
the informational or competency dimensions. According to this view, we can
consent to have sex even when not fully informed of all relevant facts, as long as
our choice is not constrained by the coercive acts of others. The paradigmatic
case of nonconsensual sex that rape law seeks to prevent is thus coerced sex. 221
Uncoerced sex, on the other hand, is not generally rape. Given that deception is
not usually coercive, sex by deception would not generally amount to rape under this view. As a result, the riddle of rape-by-deception is solved, since there is
no tension between the view of rape as coerced sex and the refusal to broadly
criminalize sex obtained by lies.
This does not mean, however, that sex by deception should never be criminalized. Although a thorough analysis of all of the circumstances in which obtaining sex by deception ought to be punished is outside the scope of this Article, in what follows I provide some brief framing principles that may help
animate future discussions about what to call sex obtained by lies and whether
to criminalize it.
A. Coercive Deception
While deception does not generally coerce, there are exceptional cases in
which it may. The most obvious case is that of a misrepresentation that may
lead a person to believe that their choices are constrained when they actually are
not. Take the case of a police officer who deceptively tells a suspect that custody
of her children will be taken from her if she does not confess to a certain crime.
This lie can be described as coercive because it pressures the suspect into confessing. To be clear, the coercion does not emanate from the lie itself. Many lies
do not pressure us into making a certain choice. There is no coercion if the suspect asks the police officer if he is a God-fearing person and the officer falsely
responds affirmatively with the hope that this will endear him to the suspect.
While the officer has certainly lied in this case, the lie is not coercive. This is the
case even if the lie makes it more likely that the suspect will confess.
By definition, a view of rape as coerced sex would prohibit sex obtained by
coercive deception. Two oft-discussed cases are illustrative. In Don Moran v.
221.
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It is worth repeating that the notion of coercion that I have in mind is quite expansive. Sex can be coerced if it is the product of physical force, but also if it results as a consequence of non-physical pressures. There can also be inherently coercive relationships and circumstances that may lead to a finding of coercion in
the context of sexual relationships.

SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION

SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF RAPE-BY-DECEPTION

People, a doctor told a fifteen-year-old girl that she had a life-threatening, ulcerated, inverted uterus and that the only way to save her life was to “enlarge her
parts.” 222 He explained that this could be done with instruments, but that she
would likely die in the process. 223 A less dangerous alternative, he said, would be
for her to have sexual intercourse with him. 224 After initially objecting, the girl
finally agreed to have sex with the doctor in order to save her life. 225 Once the
girl’s parents found out that this was all a ruse, the doctor was charged and convicted of rape by fraud. 226 The conviction was overturned on appeal because
rape required that sex be obtained by physical force and fraud does not amount
to such force. 227
The kind of deception used by the defendant in Don Moran in order to obtain sex certainly qualifies as coercive. The defendant’s lies did not merely
amount to garden-variety deception that simply makes the victim’s choice less
informed. His lies had the effect of pressuring the girl into consenting to sex
when she did not desire to do so. The pressure was considerable, since she was
falsely led to believe that she would likely die if she did not have sex with the defendant. Given the obviously coercive nature of the deception in Don Moran,
the defendant’s conduct can easily be described as rape under the coerced sex
view of the offense.
A modern case with a similar fact pattern is Boro v. Superior Court.228 The
defendant in Boro falsely told the victim that he was a doctor and that he was in
possession of medical tests that showed that she had a dangerous blood disease
that could be lethal. 229 He then told the victim that she could be cured by having sex with an anonymous donor that had been injected with a special serum
that counteracts the disease. 230 The victim had sex with the donor, who happened to be the defendant. 231 The prosecution charged the defendant with raping the victim, alleging that his fraud made her unconscious of the nature of the
act. 232 The Court of Appeals disagreed with the prosecution’s reading of the
statute, finding that the defendant’s conduct amounted to “fraud in the in222. 25 Mich. 356, 357 (1872) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223.

Id.

224. Id.
225.

Id.

226. Id. at 356–57.
227. Id. at 367.
228. 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 289(d)(4) (2017), as recognized in People v. Robinson, 370 P.3d 1043 (Cal. 2016).
229. Id. at 123.
230. Id.
231.

Id.

232.

Id. at 123–24.
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ducement” rather than “fraud in the factum,” and only the latter kind of fraud
could generate liability for rape. 233 The court explained that fraud in the factum
takes place when the defendant deceives the victim as to the nature of the act or
when the defendant impersonates being the victim’s husband. 234 It then held
that the defendant in Boro did not deceive the victim as to the nature of the act,
given that the victim was aware that she was consenting to intercourse. 235 Instead, the defendant’s deception amounted to fraud in the inducement, which is
not punishable as rape. 236
Like the deception in Don Moran, the lies told by the defendant in Boro
were clearly coercive. The deception not only made the victim’s decision to have
sex misinformed, but also pressured her into consenting. As a result of the defendant’s lies, the victim believed that she would die unless she engaged in sexual intercourse. In light of the coercive nature of the deception in Boro, the defendant would be convicted of rape under an approach to rape that views the
offense as coerced sex.
B. Deception that May Result in Serious Physical Harm
Medical malpractice law protects the informational dimension of autonomy because the consequences of misinformed consent in the medical context
are often quite dire. In addition to violating patient autonomy, uninformed
consent to medical treatment may lead to serious bodily injury or even death.
As a result, the rules governing medical malpractice require not only that doctors abstain from lying to patients, but also that they affirmatively disclose material facts related to treatment so that a patient can make a well-informed decision.
A similar argument can be made in certain limited contexts when it comes
to sexual relations. The most obvious case involves people who engage in sexual
intercourse without disclosing to their partners that they are infected with a
dangerous sexually transmitted disease (STD). The failure to disclose this information not only makes the resulting sex uninformed in a material way, but
also may result in considerable physical injury and—in extreme cases—death.
Failure to disclose such a condition prior to engaging in sex can thus be said to
not only violate the partner’s sexual autonomy, but also her physical well-being.
As a result, a strong case can be made in favor of making it a crime to have sex
without prior disclosure of a dangerous STD.
If rape is primarily conceived of as coerced sex, it is not evident that having
sex without disclosing a serious STD should amount to rape. While engaging in
this conduct certainly creates a risk of considerable physical and non-physical
233.

Id. at 125–26.

234. Id.
235.

Id. at 124–25.

236. Boro was subsequently superseded by statute, as the California Supreme Court
acknowledged in People v. Robinson, 370 P.3d 1043 (Cal. 2016).
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harm, it is difficult to describe a failure to disclose an STD as coercive. Consequently, sex obtained without such a disclosure would likely not amount to
rape if the offense is limited to coercive sex. Nevertheless, the considerable potential for harm that is inherent in engaging in this kind of conduct counsels in
favor of punishment. For example, an obvious way of doing so is by creating a
crime of intentional or reckless exposure to HIV. This is the approach taken by
many jurisdictions in the United States. 237 These statutes are often enforced. 238
In 2008, for example, an HIV-infected man was convicted by an Iowa court of
“criminal transmission of HIV” for having sex without disclosing to his partner
that he was infected with HIV. 239
It is important to note that the reason this kind of deception may rise to the
level of blameworthiness necessary to trigger the imposition of a criminal sanction is because it exposes people to serious physical injury rather than solely because it violates their sexual autonomy. As such, the decision to criminalize this
kind of deception does not lead to any particular conclusion regarding whether
to criminalize deception in other contexts.
C. Deception that Amounts to an Abuse of Authority by a Person in a
Position of Trust
There are some cases in which deception also amounts to an abuse of authority in the context of a relationship in which one party is entrusted with the
care of another. When the party entrusted with the care of another engages in
harmful deception, she has abused her authority and thus harmed the party that
she was supposed to care for in a special way. There is a sense in which the deception in these contexts is doubly blameworthy. On the one hand, it is blameworthy for the same reason that all deception is worthy of blame: it interferes
with the other person’s informational autonomy. On the other hand, deception
in this context is also blameworthy because it amounts to a breach of that trust.
It is because of this added blameworthiness that these acts of deception are
strong candidates for the imposition of criminal liability.

237.

See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 5-14-123 (2017) (making it a crime to have sex without first
informing the other person of the presence of HIV); see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS &
RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1080 (3d ed. 1982) (giving prosecution statistics).

238.

The Center for HIV Law and Policy reported 279 prosecutions and arrests for HIV
exposure in the United States from 2008 to 2016. See Positive Justice Project, Prosecutions and Arrests for HIV Exposure in the United States, 2008–2016, CTR. HIV L. &
POL’Y (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www.hivlawandpolicy
.org/files/Chart%20of%20U.S.%20Arrests%20and%20Prosecutions%20for%20HI
V%20Exposure%202008-2016%20%28January%202017%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/
29A6-NDBJ].

239. Saundra Young, Imprisoned over HIV: One Man’s Story, CNN (Nov. 9, 2012, 8:42
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/02/health/criminalizing-hiv/index.html
[http://perma.cc/3QY9-ZQ8B].
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Such breaches of trust are exemplified by cases in which doctors falsely tell
their patients that they are going to perform a medical examination when what
they actually end up doing is engaging in a sexual act. The most obvious example is that of a gynecologist who tells the patient that he will insert a medical instrument in her vagina but instead inserts his penis. In McNair v. State, for example, a gynecologist asked patients to bend over in order to perform a routine
medical examination, but instead anally penetrated them with his penis. 240
By deceiving the patient in this manner, the doctor is not only violating her
sexual autonomy, but also egregiously breaching the trust that patients place in
their physicians. When doctors take advantage of this trust, they abuse their authority in a most flagrant kind of way. This was the view taken by the court in
McNair when it upheld the defendant’s conviction for rape. In explaining why
the defendant’s conduct amounted to rape, the court pointed out that he “held
a position of trust and respect reserved for members of the medical community,” 241 and that because of this “[h]is patients came to his office on the premise
that they would receive ethical, professional medical treatment for their ailments.” 242 The deception in this case was particularly blameworthy because the
defendant “abused his professional status and trust during medical examinations that were staged to exploit his unsuspecting and vulnerable patients and
gratify his personal sexual desires.” 243
This view of the wrongfulness of these cases is not intended to minimize the
harm to the patient’s sexual autonomy that ensues when a doctor tricks the patient into having sex with him. Rather, it is meant to supplement that harm
with the additional harm that follows from the physician’s breach of trust. This
kind of sex by deception is thus more blameworthy than the run-of-the-mill
deception used to obtain sex. As the McNair Court explained, these cases are
particularly worthy of condemnation because the deception amounts to a “misuse[] [of the doctor’s] professional status” and to a breach of “trust” that
“place[s] his patients in situations where they became his vulnerable and unsuspecting prey.” 244
The standard approach to these kinds of cases in judicial opinions is to treat
them as instances of “fraud in the factum” that amount to rape because they
negate the victim’s consent. 245 They amount to fraud in the factum because the
deception prevents the victim from understanding the nature of the act. That is,
the deception causes the victim to believe that she is consenting to something
other than sexual intercourse.

240. 825 P.2d 571, 572–73 (Nev. 1992).
241.

Id. at 575.

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 237.
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The problem with the fraud in the factum approach is that it fails to criminalize deception that induces patients to have sex with the doctor if the patient/
victim was aware that she was consenting to sexual intercourse. In Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, for example, a woman seeking an abortion had sex with
her doctor after he told her that having sexual intercourse with him would help
with the procedure. 246 The defendant was convicted of rape, but the conviction
was later overturned on appeal because “[f]raud cannot be allowed to supply
the place of the force which the [rape] statute makes mandatory.” 247
The Goldenberg case would be decided differently pursuant to the approach
that I advocate here. The considerable degree of blameworthiness in these kinds
of cases is not the product of the somewhat arbitrary distinction between fraud
in the factum and fraud in the inducement. While it is true that the victim in a
fraud in the factum case (like McNair) is unaware that she is consenting to intercourse whereas a victim in a fraud in the inducement case (like Goldenberg)
is cognizant that she has acquiesced to having sex with the physician, both cases
feature deception by physicians in a position of authority that flagrantly breaches the trust that their patients have placed in them. As a result, both doctors
seem like appropriate candidates for criminal liability.
My approach would also generate liability in abuse of authority cases outside of the medical context, such as in the English case of Rex v. Williams. 248 The
defendant in Williams had sex with his music student after he pretended to be
testing her breathing power with an “instrument” and told her that her voice
would improve if she had sexual intercourse with him, as doing so would open
her air passages. 249 The deception in this case does not amount to fraud in the
factum because the student was aware that she was consenting to sex. As a result, it would not generate liability in the many jurisdictions that embrace the
fraud in the factum/fraud in the inducement distinction. In contrast, the defendant in Williams would be punished pursuant to the approach that I defend
here because the teacher’s deception amounted to a breach of the trust that the
student justifiably placed in him. As such, the deception results in an abuse of
authority that is particularly worthy of condemnation.
D. Other Cases of Deception
As I argued in Part II, modern rape statutes primarily seek to protect
against sexual coercion. Since sex obtained by deception is not usually coerced,
refusing to broadly criminalize sex by deception is not in tension with the chief
goals of contemporary rape reform. There may nevertheless be cases of sex by
deception that we wish to criminalize for reasons that go beyond those that inspired the modern rape reform movement. I have suggested three groups of
246. 155 N.E.2d 187, 189 (Mass. 1959).
247. Id. at 192.
248. 27 Cox C.C. 350, 350–51 (1922).
249. Id.
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cases that I believe are worthy candidates for criminal punishment. They include cases in which the deception used to obtain sex is also coercive, instances
in which great harm over and above the violation of sexual autonomy may ensue as a result of the deception, and situations in which the deception amounts
to a breach of trust by a person who occupies a special position of authority.
This list is not intended to be exhaustive. It merely accounts for cases in
which criminalization ought to be uncontroversial because the harms caused in
each of these instances go well beyond the violation of the informational dimension of autonomy. In the coercive deception cases, the misrepresentations
also violate the non-coercive dimension of autonomy. In the second group of
cases, the failure to disclose prior to having sex may result in considerable harm
to the physical well-being of the person and, in some cases, death. Finally, the
deception in abuse of authority cases amounts to a flagrant breach of trust that
is of considerable blameworthiness.
There will surely be other groups of cases of sex by deception that warrant
criminalization. While identifying such cases is beyond the scope of this Article,
it is useful to briefly highlight several considerations that ought to be taken into
account when deciding whether to punish additional cases of sex by deception.
1.

Lying To Obtain Sex Is Generally Worse than Having Sex Without
Prior Disclosure of Material Facts

As an initial consideration, it is important to take into account how much
the deception impacted the informational dimension of autonomy. As shown in
Part I, the informational dimension of autonomy is scalar. Consequently,
choices can range from being fully informed, to partially informed, to completely uninformed. Different kinds of deception will have a differential impact
on how informed the resulting choice is. Some choices will be misinformed because of affirmative misrepresentations (i.e., lying), whereas some will simply be
uninformed because of failure to disclose material facts (i.e., passive deception).
There are three reasons that make the case in favor of criminalizing sex obtained by lying stronger than the case supporting criminalization of sex without
prior disclosure of material facts. First, criminalization of lying infringes less on
our liberty than punishing failures to disclose. The duty imposed when lying is
criminalized is solely to abstain from intentionally making false assertions. In
contrast, the duty imposed when an obligation to disclose is required is to affirmatively reveal facts about your person. The latter duty is considerably more
liberty-infringing than the former. Second, lying usually impacts informational
autonomy more than passive deception, given that misinformed choices are less
autonomous than uninformed choices. Third, lying is generally more blameworthy than passive deception. 250 It follows that obtaining sex as a result of af-

250. See generally Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral
Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
157, 165 (2001).
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firmative fraud is more worthy of condemnation than obtaining sex as a result
of failing to disclose material facts.
While there are good reasons to abstain from criminalizing sex that is obtained without previous disclosure of material facts, there are exceptional cases
in which criminalization may be warranted. The most obvious example is the
failure to disclose a dangerous STD. These kinds of cases were discussed in
some length in Section IV.B. of this Article.
2.

Abstain from Criminalizing Deception that Furthers Privacy or
Autonomy Interests

There are some cases in the sexual context in which the use of deception directly or indirectly furthers the privacy interests of the deceiving party. The case
of the Scottish transgendered man discussed in the Introduction is a good example. The man was convicted of sexual assault by fraud for hiding his gender
history from his girlfriend. 251 Without minimizing how the man’s failure to disclose may have infringed on his girlfriend’s informational autonomy, a strong
case can be made in favor of not punishing this kind of deception.
The problem with punishment in cases like this is that the defendant’s decision to hide information about his gender history can be justified as a way of
furthering his privacy interests. To impose a duty to disclose his gender history
would force him to reveal very personal information that he may legitimately
want to keep private. It can plausibly be argued that in cases like this the harm
to informational autonomy that is caused by the lack of disclosure is outweighed by the harm to privacy that would be caused if disclosure is required.
Privacy interests could also be implicated in cases in which defendants
make assertions regarding their feelings for the other person. We may have
good reasons for not wanting judges involved in figuring out whether expressions of love are sincere. Any process designed to ferret out the sincerity of such
assertions will inevitably end up delving into private matters that should not
generally be of concern to a liberal polity.
3.

Other Cases

There are surely other cases in which sex obtained by deception causes serious harms that transcend the infringement of the victim’s informational autonomy. Perhaps some cases of sex by deception cause considerably more emotional harm than others. If so, the argument in favor of punishing sex by
deception gets stronger in direct proportion to the amount of emotional harm
caused by the deception.
Compare the following two cases. In the first case, a Ryan Seacrest lookalike convinces a diehard fan of Seacrest’s to have sex with him by falsely claiming that he is, in fact, the celebrity. In the second case, a man obtains sex from
his longtime girlfriend after courting her for months and falsely claiming that
251.

Sex Fraud Woman Put on Probation, supra note 6.
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he will marry her, that he is childless, and that he is single. While the deception
in both cases can be described as material to the victim’s decision to have sex,
the second case will likely cause considerably more emotional harm than the
first. If so, the arguments in favor of criminalizing the second case are stronger
than those in favor of punishing the first. We may still abstain from criminalizing the second case if we find that the emotional harm caused is not of a sufficient magnitude to trigger the imposition of criminal liability. Still, the case for
criminalization is stronger in this case than in cases where less emotional harm
is caused.
There are doubtless many other cases of sex by deception that cause serious
emotional harm in addition to the infringement of informational autonomy. A
comprehensive discussion of such cases exceeds the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, a sound general rule when approaching these cases is that the more serious the emotional harm that is caused by the deception, the stronger the argument in favor of criminalization.
Conclusion
The history and nature of modern rape reform, coupled with an analysis of
the meaning and scope of consent and autonomy, reveal that the best understanding of contemporary rape doctrine is as a body of law that seeks to protect
against coerced sex. While sex obtained by deception is obviously problematic,
it simply does not raise the same concerns that sex obtained by coercion does
under conditions of male dominance. It is thus unsurprising that modern rape
statutes broadly criminalize coercion but only selectively punish deception. As a
result—and contrary to what Rubenfeld argues—our current approach to rapeby-deception does not threaten to unravel the conceptual framework upon
which modern rape law is erected.
While there is no inherent tension between a view of rape that primarily
seeks to prohibit coerced sex and the refusal to broadly criminalize sex by deception, I have provided some guiding principles that may help courts and legislatures decide when to criminalize sex obtained by deception. The suggested
approach would only selectively criminalize sex obtained by deception. In contrast to what Rubenfeld suggests, such selective criminalization is not incompatible with the kind of sexual autonomy that lies at the core of modern rape statutes. The riddle of rape-by-deception is thus solved.
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